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POLAND

Politburo Member on PZPR Structural Changes, Needs

90EP0208A Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish
No 10, October 89 pp 10-11

[Interview with Janusz Kubasiewicz, PZPR Politburo member, first secretary, PZPR Committee, Warsaw, by Jerzy Papuga; dated October 1989; place not given]

[Excerpts] [KONFRONTACJE] I see that the building at 1 Chopin St is renovated. Is this related to the rumors that the Warsaw Committee is leaving it?

[Kubasiewicz] This building has been connected with the party since the days of the PPR [Polish Workers Party]. Several academic institutes, two periodicals and the Warsaw 2000 Club are located in our building. Today we are considering how to make more multipurpose use of it.

[KONFRONTACJE] You are known for making very broad general statements. Do you feel yourself to be a master of Aesopian language?

[Kubasiewicz] I always try to be honest both in my speech and in my actions. If my statements arouse emotions—and I have much proof of that—this means that they are not always vague. I see that you want to have a so-called caustic interview. Good, I am interested in showing the readers of your publication the situation of the party battling to regain trust.

[KONFRONTACJE] Fine, then please tell me what will be the scope of the pregress purge in the PZPR.

[Kubasiewicz] Purge! It seems that you are confused about historical periods.

[KONFRONTACJE] Pardon me, how about the reduction in the PZPR political apparatus?

[Kubasiewicz] Reduction has premises which are both economic and political. We are adapting our activity to what is possible. We have many plans. For example, we want to restructure committees into management organizational units so that we may develop methods to do the program work of the party. We also wish to create our own economic units. I think that this current of economic resourcefulness will improve the self-esteem of party members and will create solid foundations for economic independence. The reorganization of party structures is planned. This will involve cadre decisions. However, we are trying not to lose people. The Polish left cannot afford this. At present we need cells that have an analytical and prognostic character, not only an organizational character. The PZPR does not plan to duplicate the government. We want to struggle for the interests of working people. We want the values shared by the working class to be taken into consideration in policy.

[KONFRONTACJE] You have a neighbor who has taken a vigorous approach to the task at hand...

[Kubasiewicz] Yes, one of my many "neighbors" in this building is Mieczyslaw Wilczek. He was assigned the task of stimulating economic activity in the party. He moved into the KW [Voivodship Committee] headquarters, is building a team of specialists and is himself working with society. [passage omitted]

[KONFRONTACJE] It is interesting that there are so many contradictory opinions floating around about Janusz Kubasiewicz. For example, there is the view that you are a renowned expert on the mentality of the apparatchik, on the other hand, the view that you are actually the leader of the apparatus, the view that you are versed in it. If you confirm this, would it not mean that you hold in your hands a chunk (if not all) the authority in the PZPR?

[Kubasiewicz] Of course I consider that I am familiar with the problems of the party apparatus, but you quite exaggerate with this idea of "all the authority." I am merely a member of the eligible central and voivodship authorities.

[KONFRONTACJE] You have allegedly developed the concepts of work with the apparatus.

[Kubasiewicz] It is not "allegedly" that "I have developed" this. We have developed it! I am trying to work in a body. I am familiar with the work of the party apparatus because that was my political path. If someone believes that I am a conservative because I have influence in the apparatus, he has succumbed to very primitive propaganda. Today's apparatus is not concrete but a body of educated, enlightened people who are open to society. It is the apparatus which is cocreating the current democratic changes. The apparatus will be smaller, but it must be better paid. It must be more efficient, more flexible and more competent. We want to utilize the experiences and achievements of civilization known in the West. We want to introduce a few extremely well-paid positions for the critical people who are not happy with the way things are, who are not shy and are focused on progress. Let them work and compete and have an excellent standard of living. Do you have a problem with this? [passage omitted]

[KONFRONTACJE] How many employees do you need in the apparatus to run the Committee effectively?

[Kubasiewicz] The employees are one part of the whole which determines results. Obviously, it is not a question of quantity, but quality. And it is also one of wages. A good professional does not come to the party apparatus if he is not offered a suitable wage. And so we are finished with employees who do not keep pace with changes in the party. There will be fewer of us, but we will be more efficient and better paid. It is my feeling that a group of 40-50 KW employees could completely suffice. However, society's support is an issue that is vital to the leftist movement. We are keeping on many of

our comrades in consultative, advisory and social bodies. We plan to lean even more heavily on the social aktiv.

[KONFRONTACJE] Are you not aware that the political role of the party apparatus is seen as demonic?

[Kubasiewicz] Undoubtedly it is. In particular, the opinions that the apparatus manipulates and that it is not concerned about the interests of society, but only about the implementation of goals designated by the leadership and the like are unjust. These are slogans which harm honest people.

[KONFRONTACJE] But I have the impression that only the apparatus is left in the PZPR, that it works for itself alone.

[Kubasiewicz] Unfortunately, you are moving in the usual pattern of antiparty propaganda. What does this "work for itself alone" mean?

[KONFRONTACJE] Could it mean to obtain at any price a position for the apparatus as the demiurge of the situation in the PZPR?

[Kubasiewicz] The party apparatus serves a party of 2 million members. You are placing an ant beside an elephant and you are pretending that the ant is pulling the elephant toward itself, that it is doing with it what it wants. That is not so. [passage omitted]

[KONFRONTACJE] There is the lingering notion that you and Manfred Gorywoda are the biggest conservatives in the PZPR. It is said that you are "concrete."

[Kubasiewicz] I shall not talk for Manfred Gorywoda. Whoever uses these slogans is making use of old, despicable propaganda tricks. The people who created this myth do not know me, my style or the effects of my work. I was given the label "concrete" during the electoral campaign to the Sejm. I was described in this way by first and last name in GAZETA WYBORCZA along with the entire Warsaw party organization. I have one answer to this propaganda: I will not go around humiliating myself in sackcloth and ashes and I will not prove that I am not a camel. The Warsaw organization finds itself today at the forefront of the reform current. Everyone who knows about our work is aware of this. [passage omitted]

[KONFRONTACJE] Professor Kubiak is promoting the idea that the PZPR can no longer base its political importance on party members, but must look for the support of the electorate.

[Kubasiewicz] I agree with Hieronim Kubiak's idea. I also believe that if we expand our influence in the electorate it is also possible to rebuild primary party ties.

[KONFRONTACJE] How do you foresee the PZPR ending up?

[Kubasiewicz] That is a very drastic question. The party is in need of change, but not only through negotiation or

a change in the name. Basic reform is needed, not empty declarations. A change in the signboard means nothing. The essence of the issue is to create a party of parliamentary democracy, a party of people of hired labor that defends the interests of these people and the values of socialism, a party that operates under conditions of political pluralism, struggling to regain authority.

[KONFRONTACJE] Will you become Social Democrats?

[Kubasiewicz] We will be the party of the Polish socialist left. We shall learn to be the party of parliamentary democracy.

Christian-Democratic-Oriented Labor Party Platform Stated

90EP0222A Warsaw LAD in Polish 15 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Witold Gadowski, Maciej Letowski, and Jacek Maziarski, signed May 1989: "Our Program for the Labor Party"]

[Text]

Our Values

The Labor Party is a political party uniting people of various classes and social groups who adhere closely to the Christian-democratic ideology. The following values serve to ground us in this ideology:

A. Christianity. The Polish state ought to stand on the foundation of Western civilization whose basis is Christianity, and the Christian ethic must be the basis of the legal order.

B. Democracy. By democracy we mean not only the mechanisms of exercising authority but also tolerance for viewpoints differing from our own, the right to the diversity that enriches the life of society and the right of groups and territorial communities to organize themselves.

C. Sovereignty of the nation. The national culture, tradition and spiritual wealth of the nation represent, for our society and for the individual, a form of wealth that cannot be replaced by material well-being. The Polish nation has the right and the obligation to develop its material and spiritual culture within the framework of an independent and sovereign state.

D. The dignity of the individual. In keeping with the Christian view of the individual person, we oppose the domination of structures over individuals.

E. Private property. Private property or a certain disposition of exterior goods gives each person the space required for personal and familial autonomy and private property can be seen as a kind of broadening of human freedom. It constitutes a certain kind of basic condition necessary for civic freedoms for it awakens in people the

willingness to accept responsibility and to bear burdens (Pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et spes").

F. Administration of the law. Law may not be subordinated to immediate political aims. Law must guarantee to the individual, the citizen and the producer the freedom indispensable for his development. Law must assume that within the state there are stable conditions necessary for the activity of all forces.

G. Social justice. In keeping with the social teachings of the Church, we reject a social and economic order that assures wealth and security for the few while consigning the weak to a vegetation unworthy of a European society nearing the end of the 20th century.

What Must Be Changed

The crisis that Poland is now undergoing is caused by its imposition of doctrinal solutions which are in conflict with its tradition and needs. According to the doctrine which has been in effect since 1944, individual interests have become subordinate to interests of structures: the class, the party and the state. Depriving the individual of the freedom to determine his own fate has destroyed his sense of responsibility for his own fate and the fate of his family. This has had destructive consequences for people's attitudes and it has resulted in social ills.

The work ethic, without which it is impossible to build a modern civilization, has declined.

Drunkenness has grown to unheard-of proportions as a consequence of the planned destruction of traditional values and social ties.

Natural interpersonal ties and the ties of local communities have been destroyed. This phenomenon was treated by the state as an inevitable stage in the introduction of its vision of the "administered society."

The principle of "levelling down" has destroyed individuals and groups who would be the natural leaders of society.

The family has degenerated as a result of other social ills and faulty economic doctrine.

In state policy human beings have been reduced to the dimension of manpower, which has put "nonproductive" groups, e.g., retirees, at a disadvantage.

The introduction of doctrinal solutions in the economy has become a cause of civilizational regress.

The institutions of property, the market and money have been destroyed. They have been replaced by universal nationalization.

The continuity of Poland's development within the European framework has been disrupted.

The enterprising spirit has been replaced by administration, which has curbed dynamism and innovation and has fostered passivity and self-centered shrewdness.

Exploitative economic policy emanating from a lack of responsibility for the object of administration has led to the destruction of natural resources and the polluting of the environment.

The nationalization of the sphere of social services (education, environmental protection, housing management and culture) has led to degeneration in this sphere through the maintaining of the state's doctrinal control over it. The imposition of a new system in Poland in 1944 is linked with the brutal destruction of all forms of political life known in countries with a European civilization. These forms of political life were replaced by a new mechanism of government. This mechanism has proved to be ruinous for society and ineffective for those in power.

The dictatorship of the party and the state over consciences and consciousness constitutes brutal violence against the natural rights of man. It has led to the destruction of traditional values and the impoverishment of national culture.

The introduction of the universal nomenklatura system was the cause of the negative selection of leaders in the sphere of politics and the economy. It has led to a general lack of responsibility for decisionmaking and has deprived society of its control over decisions.

The treatment of the law as a political instrument has led to the anarchization of social, political and economic life.

Natural social life has been suppressed by the police vision of order.

There can be no question of leading Poland out of its state of decline unless the aforementioned ills are eliminated.

What Is Our Aim?

The goal of our actions is the creation in Poland of a new order in which the values we profess may be realized. We aim to introduce the following elements of the new order:

A. To ensure the free development of the individual, the freedom and security of the person, the freedom of religion and convictions, freedom of speech and the press, the right to form associations, professional organizations and political parties. All national minorities should have the right to develop their own culture, religion and education.

B. To ensure conditions for family development, above all the material independence of the family based on a just wage for men or the possession of their own means of production. One of the basic conditions for family development is to ensure them housing. To the extent that it is possible, families should be the possessors of various forms of capital.

C. Freedom of education. Parents have the exclusive right to determine the direction of their own children's education. They should have influence over the program of schooling and the freedom to choose it. We support the development of nonstate schools. They should not be discriminated against in the distribution of subsidies. Higher schools should be guaranteed self-government in accordance with their needs and tradition.

D. The transfer of local affairs to the self-government. The regional administration should become an organ of the self-government and not an extension of the central administration. The territorial self-government should be guaranteed economic independence, including communal property.

E. The development of all forms of self-government of citizens, groups and professional communities, employee self-governments and school self-governments. Organizational pluralism is indispensable. No organization in the state may have privileged status.

F. Economic freedom. The market should be the basic regulator of the economy. In accordance with the principle of serviceability, the state should interfere in the affairs of the economy only when other organizational units cannot resolve a problem. The introduction of the institutions of property, money and capital are indispensable. Through universal reprivatization and a change in Poland's economic structure, the Polish economy should conform to the economies of Western Europe.

G. A reduction of the state's role in the economy. The state can and should function in the economy in the following fields: the economic infrastructure, actions which must be centrally directed such as monetary policy and problems emanating from "developmental challenges" and joining in international cooperation.

Actions by the state comprised of the following are forbidden:

- a) nationalization as a permanent economic tendency,
- b) ongoing financial aid for enterprises running a deficit,
- c) the establishment of prices by the state, except for special circumstances,
- d) the legal monopolization of any field by the state or an institution designated by it, with the exception of indispensable cases.

It is the role of the state is to be concerned over the protection and observance of the law in economic activities. The state's concern is to ensure that no interest group becomes too predominant in society, allowing it to dictate monopolistic terms and endangering the existence of free competition. This applies both to industrial organizations and union organizations.

H. Granting agriculture a special place in the economy. The importance of agriculture emanates from its exclusive role in ensuring the welfare of the people and the independence of the state. Private farms are the foundation of agriculture. Their role cannot be reduced to economic functions alone. Because of their cultural, ecological and national significance, ongoing state help for farms should be allowed in certain cases.

I. Establishing democratic mechanisms for exercising authority. The Sejm, elected in free and democratic elections, should become the highest legislative authority in the state. We consider the restoration of the institution of the Senate to be appropriate. A strong and competent executive authority, whose makeup should reflect the power structure in parliament is indispensable.

Independent courts exercise judicial authority.

J. The removal of social care from the hands of the state. Compulsory retirement insurance, renter's insurance and health insurance, along with the guarantee of the free choice of the insuring institution should be a guarantor of social security. Conditions should also be created for voluntary forms of insurance beyond those prescribed by law. The system of social insurance should include unemployment compensation.

Social care should be implemented by the various kinds of plants, foundations and charitable institutions that arise out of funds and remain under the control of the state, churches, local self-governments, enterprises, associations and individuals.

Various forms of ownership of health service facilities should exist. These must be based on sound economic principles, and the costs of their services should be refunded to a specified extent by insurance institutions.

K. The guarantee of free access to means of social communication. The mass media have the obligation to reflect the views of society as faithfully as possible. They should operate within the bounds of public morality. It is appropriate for radio and television to remain within the hands of the state and to ensure parliament's social control over them. We permit the right to establish nonstate radio and television stations.

L. The reform of the army and the police. The role of the army is to ensure the sovereignty and integrity of the state and to protect the national interest. A structural, moral, organizational and technical reform of the army is necessary. The army must be a national institution which is neutral politically and ideologically.

The police should be professional and free of party entanglements.

M. A stable international policy, the goal of which should be to gain for Poland its proper place in Europe. We recognize the importance of all international treaties and obligations concluded by the Polish state. We consider the present borders of Poland to be inviolable. Poland

should establish relations with all states and peoples based on the principles of cooperation and mutual benefits. In the future, it should find its place in a Europe which is united and free of military blocs.

How Do We Wish To Operate?

The Labor Party, being at present an opposition party, operates openly and legally.

The Labor Party is a democratic party. It bases its activity upon the activism of its members, professional groups, community groups and territorial groups. The program of the Labor Party is the result of the aims and aspirations of its members and the groups of which it is composed. In implementing the program, the members exercise the freedom of choice of organizational forms and methods of operating.

The Labor Party aims to become a modern people's party, banding together the representatives of various social groups, accepting Christian and democratic values.

The program of the Labor Party will be implemented through evolutionary changes. In its implementation, our party is ready to conclude alliances with various political forces which profess democratic values.

The Labor Party is a party of secular people who operate independently of all external institutions. We recognize the tremendous authority of the Church and we take its instructions into account in our actions.

We base the participation of the Labor Party in representative bodies upon the degree of their acceptance by society. The more they express the will of the whole of society, the greater will be our readiness to take part in their work. The Labor Party bases its participation in public life upon the creation of suitable conditions for the operation of the entire opposition.

The Labor Party is an integral part of the international Christian-Democratic movement. It shall aim to establish contacts with parties in other countries and to gain membership in the European Christian-Democratic Union.

We are in a period when the fate of independent political organizations is unknown. The fate of political pluralism in Poland is being decided. The implementation of the program depends upon the active support of society.

Sejm Marshal on Internal Parliamentary, Deputy Club Problems

90EP0214A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
2 Nov 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with Mikołaj Kozakiewicz, Sejm marshal, by Dorota Ciepiewska: "The Need for a Normal Parliament: Should We Limit the Sejmocracy?"; date and place not given]

[Text] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] The political and social bases of the functioning of parliament are undergoing change. It was once accepted—as a result of the rejection of the free play of political forces—that there exists a political unity of society. The Sejm of today represents the negation of that theory.

[Kozakiewicz] There never was such a moral-political unity. That theory was a pious wish and a propaganda slogan. What is said today bears a closer relationship to reality. Today we speak about differentiation within society and pluralism in the areas of world view, culture, nationality and politics.

Now an entirely different version of "unity" has arisen; namely, the conviction that a community of actions is indispensable to get out of this critical impasse. That conviction is visibly present in the forum of the Sejm. Now, especially after the creation of a government by Premier Mazowiecki, there is no interfactional strife even though the fact that the community established by the necessity of working toward the primary goal in no way erases the profound differences in politics and world view of the various elements of the broad coalition.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What is the bond that binds into a unified whole such varied elements in order that, hopefully, they might work together effectively?

[Kozakiewicz] The common necessity of leading Poland out of a profound economic crisis and the concomitant political and moral crises. So much for the plane of goals. On the formal-organizational plane, there are two such "binding" elements: one, at the level of the Sejm, is a new, "narrower" coalition that still has not attained an ideal shape, is fragile and provokes various objections in various quarters, but which did make possible the establishment of Mazowiecki's government. In this case, the "binding" force proved to be the premier's tactic of creating a cabinet based not on the monopoly of some political force, but rather on the cooperation of all forces, in carefully weighed proportions, in carefully chosen areas.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] We are building a parliamentary democracy. How would you describe this goal?

[Kozakiewicz] We must attain the state of affairs in which the various political forces have an influence on the course of events in our country that is exactly proportional to their real support in our society. There is no need to hide the fact that the present Sejm does not yet fully reflect such a proportional concept, for some groupings enjoy a higher representation, others, a lower one than they ought to, judging by the societal attitudes revealed by the elections. Therefore, parliamentary democracy is a state of affairs in which the future disposition of parliament will exactly correspond to the degree of support accorded to the various parties and orientations by the active strata of society. I stress the word active for all the parties are troubled by the visible

falling off of interest in political life of large segments of society, a fact that is proved by the low turnout at the elections.

Moreover, the parliamentary democracy we have in mind signifies not only tying together election results with Sejm representation, but also a broadening in the area of representation itself. After all, numerous groupings are unrepresented here in the Sejm. Those include, for example, parties like the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] and the Labor Party, as well as various unrepresented factions in groups that are in general represented both in the people's movement and in Solidarity. Consequently, we have a long way to go before we reflect the voters' preferences regarding the numbers of seats in the parliament and the guarantee for all political orientations of appropriate influence on the course of events in our country.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The basic functions of the Sejm—making laws, controlling the work of the government—will be retained. Very likely the Sejm's way of performing these functions will change.

[Kozakiewicz] Of course, and that is because the Sejm, as recently as its last term, was not a place where the most important decisions were really made. These were made elsewhere and the deputies could, at best, suggest amendments. They could not totally reject decisions made elsewhere. Moreover, the absolute majority enjoyed before by the PZPR guaranteed that ultimately such decisions were always "pushed through." Therefore, it was revolutionary when the PZPR took the self-limiting step of becoming a minority force in the Sejm. That step opened the floodgates of change and brought us closer to true parliamentary democracy.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] And yet, should the entire accomplishment of postwar Polish parliamentary activity be "crossed out with the thick line" that the premier mentioned?

[Kozakiewicz] That is a broader issue. In any area at all, should the postwar accomplishment be "crossed out with a thick line"? A tendency to think so does exist. I understand it, but only among young people who do not know about the starting point. Have we essentially created no values in these 45 years? Lenin once spoke about the children's malady of leftishness. We are living through another children's illness—the rejection and lumping together for condemnation of the entire postwar past.

The best proof that we must not necessarily and immediately reject everything that has gone before is the fact that the Senate and the Sejm are working on the basis of existing rules and laws about duties and rights of deputies. Of course, these rules and laws must be brought into line with present reality, but for the last 3 months, they have been the basis of an effective operation.

Another proof—a negative one—is that there has been an obvious tendency to undervalue the institution of

consultation merely because it was used under the old system only formally and for propaganda purposes. This tendency is one of the things that led to the problems we are experiencing with the law about cooperatives, a measure that was passed without consultation with the personnel of cooperatives.

I think that we ought to continue many experiments from preceding terms. Once, for example, our cooperation with other countries was markedly broader and, especially, more systematically carried on. As recently as the winter of this year, there were in the Sejm the first meetings with the heads of parliamentary bodies in Europe, Canada and the U.S.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What kind of deputy equipped with what sort of knowledge is needed in order to create the foundation of the new reality?

[Kozakiewicz] I would say, rather, that specific character traits are required. When decisions were made outside the Sejm, the deputy looked out for the interests of his professional group, on principle, in the implementation phase rather than in the conception phase, on which he did not have any influence. At the present time, the task is not to execute concepts handed down from above, but rather to forge concepts. Consequently, deputies are no longer only ambassadors to the Sejm from various particular professional or regional groups, but now they are also agents for the future of the country.

Some deputies are still finding it difficult to determine their roles in a situation where interests of social strata and classes and regional interests clash with general ones of the entire state. A classic case is the issue of nuclear power plant construction. Even those who admit the necessity of taking advantage of this form of energy production do not want such power plants in their bailiwicks. A good deal depends upon the courage of the individual deputy. He must be able, particularly before the cameras, to stand up in defense of the general good and support a solution that is unpopular in his own constituency.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] The constant pressure to speed up legislative work does not give the deputies much of a crack at making rational decisions.

[Kozakiewicz] This is a very disadvantageous situation. At the beginning for several weeks the Sejm agreed to it in the name of aiding the government, taking into consideration the pressure of public opinion (indexation). The first fears of rebellion appeared at the last, inhumanly stepped up plenary meeting. Two commissions protested to me stating that in the future they would not examine draft laws according to this procedure. I have received written protests from deputies. Changes are indispensable in the government's preparation of laws with regard to deadlines, what kinds of changes are made and how they are made.

This situation has very complex causes. Partly it is due to the fact that the Sejm is also learning to be the Sejm and

the ministers are learning to be ministers. Moreover, the economic situation in which the government began its work is very difficult. The pressure of social discontent caused by it and the desire to minimize the possible conflicts emanating from this are so enormous that time and again the government forces the Sejm to operate outside of the regulations. Every second case is sent in as a rush order and is given an emergency examination. This must be straightened out as soon as possible, for the Sejm cannot raise up to the status of a rule what may be an exception to the rule.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] A very rich club life is a new phenomenon of the 10th term. Where does the boundary of autonomy lie for clubs? The OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club], e.g., is creating a clearly separate structure.

[Kozakiewicz] Based on this example it is quite evident that if there is no political party which the club would represent, then it begins to play the role of a party and itself becomes the forge of the policy of this assembly. Moreover, the classic structure in which a club represents a party and executes its will within the parliament has been overturned in the PZPR and in the ZSL and the SD. The clubs played an inspirational role and helped to hasten changes. Is this normal? No. Does it prove that the clubs are sick? No, it proves that the parties which are now undergoing an identity crisis and a crisis of structures and principles of operating, are sick. Tendencies toward the autonomy of clubs which are nonsense from the viewpoint of normal parliamentary order, are very clear, but only within certain limits is this a tool of progress and party modernization. If these limits are exceeded it may lead to the total disintegration of parties.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] I recall that you took over the function of Sejm marshal with some reservations. What is the situation today?

[Kozakiewicz] I was completely aware of how difficult this office is and that I would not be able to imitate previous marshals in my work because of the completely different makeup of the Sejm and its different role. I believe that I have been successful in taking several steps towards giving the Sejm marshal a new role.

At this time I believe that it would be worthwhile to limit to some extent what I would call the Sejmocracy, i.e., that the major source of authority—not only the proclamation of the law but also the making of detailed decisions—is here. I have this in mind because, given the necessarily lengthy Sejm procedure, we are unable to react to everything that shocks the government quickly and flexibly. It would be good to have some sort of delegation of powers granted by the Sejm to the government regarding strictly specified matters for a specified period. This would streamline the governing process and it would enable the Sejm to work systematically on

legislation for the new model of the state. The Sejm is an institution invented to work under normal conditions, which we still do not have.

Role To Be Played by Youth in Changing Political Climate Viewed

90EP0223A Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in
Polish No 41, 8 Oct 89 pp 3-4

[Article by Jacek Kurczewski: "The Plan for the Year 2000"]

[Text] "Well, I don't know what a young Pole is thinking, but I know what I would like him to be thinking: 'Look, I'm living in times of great changes. This is the time of the greatest hope for my country in many, many years. And I want to be a part of what is going on. I want to participate.'" (From an interview with President George Bush for the Polish press, POLITYKA, No 27, 1989).

It is autumn. The harvests and fall festivals have come and gone already, and planting time is upon us. The new school and academic year are the best occasion for taking a moment to consider the problems facing our younger generation. Everyone looks at it differently, and nobody has a franchise on the truth here. Young people have a better view of the future, because they already have one foot planted in it. Older people, on the other hand, have a keen vision of it, because since they are not tied to the future they can take a disinterested look at it. Some people feel helpless, because everything they have been doing their whole life long today looks like a ruin adorned with a newly hoisted flag of freedom. Others stand helplessly beside the ruin, unable to decide from which side they should begin rebuilding. It therefore comes as no surprise that so many people are deciding to run away. After all, there are countries and continents where the grass really is greener and the air cleaner, where the average citizen can actually enjoy the riches of the 20th century every day.

Do President Bush's words not seem ironic in this situation? Is it perhaps that behind these words there is the fear that the line for foreign immigration visas will increase tenfold and more? Or maybe the words conceal the desire of those who have managed to be better off to wash their hands of the matter? Can Poles of advanced age say this of themselves to young people without shame? Can young Poles say this to one another in all sincerity? What will happen to them after the year 2000? What do we propose to them for the future? Who is going to wait for the day after tomorrow, if tomorrow is going to be still worse?

We have to look for the answers in two time perspectives, taking into account not only the urgent needs of the present day but also the longer range view of the world and Poland in the 21st century. I think that young people need this sort of view the most, the notion that they can do it on their own but that they will also value older people for having been the ones to propose to them this very way of seeing things.

The competition for the hearts of young people will be won by whoever offers the better and more attractive plan for the future. It is not a question of implementing this plan through administrative commands—we have already been through this lesson with the results that are familiar to everyone—but of having both the more general goals and the specific targets known. If nobody presents such a plan to Polish young people, then they will vote with their feet the way they do today, and only the Western visa restrictions will be able to save our nation from extinction.

Youth and Politics

From the politicians' standpoint, who are the younger generation? In a totalitarian society there is the assurance that the previous system will be able to continue in the future, provided that young people are skillfully controlled by the proper mass organizations. In a democratic society, young people are an interesting group which can provide votes either for one party or another and which must therefore be made an attractive offer prior to the elections. As we move from totalitarianism to democracy, the mass organization structures shaped under Stalin to predispose people to labor and defense will disappear. In Poland these organizations reached their peak development for such a short time that today they hardly operate at all outside the narrow confines of the communist party cadres. Independent youth organizations and movements were able to create alternative elites of this type back in the middle of the 1970's, and their initial followers today hold public positions. Nonetheless, during the first few months, we should anticipate the following three processes:

First, some organizations will usurp a particular role in the unconscious effort to duplicate the model of totalitarian groups. The Independent Association of Students, or NZS, might be the simplest example. It is true that some of my most vital and intellectually stimulated students belong, but they themselves are afraid that the NZS is too reminiscent of the ZSP, in the effort to be the sole representative of college students. After all, like the ZSP, the NZS has no clear ideological platform. It is a sort of avant-garde organization, one which used to be counter-avant-garde, but now that it has gained political experience, it is coming out with slogans which are popular in the student community, calling for scholarships, examination privileges, a free choice of people conducting the examinations, and a role in running the institutions of higher education (and increasingly unpopular in the teaching community, which is aware of the need to bolster academic discipline, if it is to mean or teach anything to the students during these times).

Second, the various political parties are going to try to organize their own youth groups and sections similar to the young socialists and young conservatives in the West. Other than the special role of organizations previously connected to the ruling party, the PZPR, up until now only the popular movement has had a youth organization which was justifiably proud of its heritage, despite

the fact that it suffered from all the ills of totalitarianism. Even the SD had trouble creating a similar youth organization, trying to expand its influence in society in keeping with the percentage it had gained in the leadership as the result of the roundtable talks. Now we should expect to see a whole series of efforts also to create youth organizations linked to the PPS, Labor Party, National Party, and so on, because it is natural for senior politicians to go after the support of young voters and to prepare cadre replacements who will insure their organization's political survival.

Third, the crisis situation and the emergence of a new political class which encompasses people from various political camps which had previously been fighting one another will lead the younger generation to make various sorts of attempts to organize themselves using slogans of independence and the mistreatment of their generation. This line of development appeared in the past in the form of various alternative movements, mainly in the realm of "culture." We became convinced that in this century the younger generation's music could be the means of group identity, in place of periodicals, party uniforms, and political rallies. The "music" movements are therefore movements with a political nature, even if they do not refer directly to political issues. The ecological problems are another example of a sphere of operation in which the younger generation's growing sense of alienation can find forms of political expression which are alternatives to those of their elders. It is clear that various representatives of the older generation which had no success with them in the political arena will look for a way to seize control of such movements, as they have done in the past.

None of these tendencies is tragic in and of itself. Nor is there any reason to try (unsuccessfully) to prevent them. It is important, however, that alongside these processes, which will make the younger generation different from society as a whole, there be support for processes which bring people together. Several percent of young people are interested in politics as such, but all of them can be attracted to politics in an inflammatory situation. On the other hand, a "healthy" society needs to have certain groups which gather the younger generation's aspirations and bind young people to the nation, that is, to the society, in its historic existence. It is the government's task to support such processes, because it is the government that is to carry out the tasks in the citizenry's common interest.

Three Tasks

Anyone who has talked to people who have fled Poland knows that the most frequent pervasive element justifying the decision was not so much the low standard of living as the absence of any prospects for the future. This concept hides the long-stated feeling that one has no impact on his life situation, that ingenuity, industry, and perspicacity produce little, and that one will not be able to keep whatever little he does manage to acquire. In psychological terms, what is perhaps most lacking is not

so much the possibility of becoming rich as security of existence, that is, knowing that whatever I have will not be taken from me and that if I want to achieve something, there is a certain probability that it can be achieved in a certain amount of time. A minimal standard of living must be accompanied by some minimal security of existence. This means giving the government very important tasks in the process of building a market economy. This market must not be an uncontrolled market. Through laws the government must exercise some supervision over the security of financial turn-overs. Stable laws must in turn control possible government intervention in economic life. It is only in an atmosphere of security that a young person will feel that his long-range efforts, such as a long-term investment in the form of learning, acquiring qualifications, or savings, will be worthwhile. The market must therefore be open to all and have government supervision, to avoid a return to 19th century speculation on the part of a small minority playing an economic game among themselves, thereby increasing social tensions. After all, a "free market" is never one with absolutely no restrictions, controls, or government intervention. Anyone who invests money on this market must be certain that he will be able to go to court, if he is swindled, and anyone who invests time learning some vocation or another must have the assurance of its being worth in 10 years, and of being helped to gain different job qualifications in the event of failure. The person who is earning money must have the assurance of being able to spend it. There must be the assurance that in 10 years the garden plot, housing, and machinery one has acquired will not be nationalized (without equitable payment).

The climate of aspirations is another thing. Just as it is not worthwhile working to earn money where there is no assurance that it will not be lost immediately, so too it is not worth working for money, if obtaining it does not give a person anything. In the fable about the bees, Mandeville noted that both luxury and naught drive the economy.

In a society in which everyone has a small Fiat, nobody is motivated to get a better job, if that job does not carry any sort of distinction. A Polonez does provide some sort of distinction, so the Polonez cars will motivate people until everyone has one.

The modern economy owes its dynamic quality to just this psychological mechanism, coupled with new technology permitting the production of new sorts of goods, which continually lure people's imaginations. Generally speaking, this mechanism consists of permanently creating elite groups which possess the latest style of car, own the newest private airplane, go to the most fashionable health resort, read the most recent novel, and talk about the most modern philosophy. Today a democratic society is not one in which everyone belongs to these elite groups but one in which everyone has an opportunity to strive to belong. Therefore the thing is not for everyone to be a college graduate but for everyone to have a try at the best education, even though only one percent of each

class graduating from secondary school will be able to receive such a diploma. Various sorts of distinguishing elements are therefore necessary: managerial positions, material objects of immediate or lasting value, good schools, and good concerts, so that the endless distinction between the more and less industrious makes a tangible difference.

The spirit of competition leading continually to a distinction between those who have won and a larger group of those who have lost out in the contest need not be associated at all with dividing the society into a small class of the privileged and masses of those who are behind. The goal for the year 2000 of there being somebody to set the goals for the year 2030 is also that of creating a democratic culture. Although the attempt to link equality to distinction may seem like combining fire and water, take America as an example. Although there are great differences between individuals in terms of wealth in America, people are treated in a more egalitarian way there than in Poland, where the trickster who has earned himself \$10,000 smuggling computers or some such views with scorn the ordinary people trying to make it across the crosswalk in front of his car. The egalitarianism I am talking about is most obvious in those societies which have acquired wealth slowly through generations of hard work, that is, in the bourgeois societies of Northern Europe. Looking at America, how often we try to imitate the French, Germans, or English, instead of following the example of the Scandinavians. A well-organized Danish village seems a far more suitable model to follow than the proverbial Fibak palaces, which every peasant would like to build in the Podhale mountain valley or in Podlesie. We would also rather see the senators of the republic riding bicycles than poisoning the last fruit trees in Warsaw's botanical garden. In a crisis, modesty and self-control seem to be an especially important model for the nation's elite to impose on others. A young person born in a smoke-filled industrial area should have the sense that he too along with the others is taking part in the race under the watchful eye of an honest judge, rather than that he is a priori condemned to a life of misfortune and discrimination. The pool of elite goods must therefore be far smaller than the pool of attractive goods designated for mass consumption. A solid education should be assured to most of society, the same as modest but decent housing. This average young person from an average Polish housing development should have access to ordinary sports and ordinary entertainment, as well as a role in running the affairs of the neighborhood, not the factory and school, the way people are saying. This person should take part in public life through elections, accessible press, and interesting television, and should work for the benefit of broad public goals by serving Poland. Or, in order to avoid misunderstandings related to the organization's totalitarian tradition, something new like the White Eagle Volunteer Service, in which, on an entirely volunteer basis, young people would have the opportunity to supplement their general knowledge with

paid public work and citizenship training in a democratic spirit. This would be an opportunity to develop the proper attitudes necessary for a new democratic political order and at the same time provide help in life to the younger generation, which needs the assurance of a minimum standard of living and a chance in life, along with youth citizenship training, combining the discipline of scouting with a humanistic way of life rather than a militaristic one.

Competition among equals in the honest challenge of social community life is after all something which some people are already saying has been accomplished, but if you tell that to young people, they will laugh at you. The time of greatest hope is the time for hoping that such an ideal will be a little closer to reality. That is the plan for the year 2000.

YUGOSLAVIA

Army Paper Attacks Stanovnik Comments to DIE WELT

90EB0148A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Oct 89 pp 1, 7

[Article by Ivan Matovic: "Illusions and Appeals"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The content and message of public appearances by individuals who are defaming us in the eyes of the world, calling on certain foreign circles to put our affairs in order, provides an answer to all the questions about these "critics" and their goals.

On 13 October, the West German newspaper DIE WELT published an interview with Janez Stanovnik, the president of the Presidency of the SR [Socialist Republic of] Slovenia. Our means of public information have already written about the contents of that interview, which was conducted "with astonishing openness." As a reminder, in response to the question by the DIE WELT journalist about whether Slovenia can and should separate from Yugoslavia if the differences with "its brothers in the south" cannot be resolved in any other way, the newspaper quotes Stanovnik as saying that as early as during the Second World War Slovenia was seeking its own "right to self-determination and secession." The right to secede and the right to unite with one or more states, in his opinion, represented a "constitutional precondition" for the Slovenian nation joining, as DIE WELT terms it, "Titoist Yugoslavia." Stanovnik emphasizes that communists in Slovenia "no longer want to be Bolsheviks," but rather "democrats," whereby "the revolution has truly begun"; moreover, "the decline of socialism is the cause of Yugoslavia's and Slovenia's current difficulties." He believes that the beginning and end of democracy is the "renunciation of the communist party's monopoly," which in the future will have to act "by force of arguments, not through police control or manipulation." He also believes that Slovenians need not flee Yugoslavia, but rather should "set in motion the struggle

for the democratization of the entire country," adding: "We Slovenians certainly will not democratize Western Europe, but our aspiration must be to democratize Yugoslavia."

This leads one to conclude that passage of the recent constitutional amendments in Slovenia was a specific democratic act, but carried out "under horrible political and psychological pressure." According to Stanovnik, this was "for Slovenians at least as significant as the Second World War, when the Slovenian himself was able to prove that even he can be a soldier, and not just a servant." "This time," DIE WELT quotes Stanovnik as saying, "Slovenians have proven that they possess moral strength—even enough strength to face up to the risk of engaging the Yugoslav army against Slovenia." And when the changes in the Constitution were adopted by the Assembly of Slovenia, according to Stanovnik, "no one could say with certainty whether the army would not take action after all." "However, the mood among the people was as has been described: This time it is a question of to be or not to be."

The president of Slovenia appealed through DIE WELT to the conscience of Western Europe, emphasizing how the Helsinki Accord establishes that human rights can no longer be considered an internal affair within a country. "Thus, we expect that West European countries will consistently defend human rights not only in their own states, but also in my country.... When something happens in Yugoslavia that conflicts with human rights, then that, in my opinion, is a European issue. Whenever any nation within Yugoslavia is prevented from realizing its national rights, that too is a European problem."

If we forego further quotes, we are left with an unmistakable impression of how this appearance by Janez Stanovnik is irresistibly reminiscent of his exposition at the "Council for World Affairs" in Washington, held on 2 November of last year. On that occasion, addressing the then extremely complex socioeconomic conditions under which we must carry out reforms, as well as certain questions about Yugoslavia's economic relations with the world, his comments were so bitter, as well as tactless with his paternalistic overtones, that the Presidency and Assembly of the SFRY had to deal with the negative effects and repercussions of it among the public, both at home and abroad. This includes part of his statements about the social situation and the constitution status of our army, and especially about its role in the trial of "the Four" in Ljubljana. He told the American public that the army there "put journalists on trial, making dubious charges against them," whereby he ignored the truth that he nevertheless knew: that the issue was the publication of military secrets, for which the judiciary of every nation prescribes harsh punishment.

Touching on the situation in which the amendments to the Constitution of the SFRY have already been adopted, Stanovnik said at that meeting: "When it seemed that it would come to very unpleasant clashes with the army about the constitutional amendments,

even the archbishop of Ljubljana asked all the priests to pray for and support us, the government, including me personally."

Thus, Janez Stanovnik, the former diplomat and top official from one of our sovereign republics, is commenting to the Western world on both sides of the Atlantic, in a manner peculiar to him and hard for us to accept, about what is happening to us, and is not only belittling our social order, the achievements of the socialist revolution, and the armed forces, but even venturing to specifically call on foreign countries to intervene in our internal affairs. And the fact that this is not the only thing and that it is even becoming part of a political tactical approach—to say nothing of a platform—is evidenced by the ominous example from the very beginning of last year, when Dr. France Bucar at the session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg called on the West to refuse all financial aid to our country because that is supposedly "the best way to destroy the communist, centralist, Comintern-oriented, Stalinist regime in Yugoslavia." Addressing the Western public, Dr. Bucar said that "right now, when so-called real socialism has been incorporated into the state, Slovenians feel that even their very existence as an independent nation, the inheritor of the European legacy, is drawn into question. Without their will or consent, they have been forced to live in a state that in its fundamental philosophy and ideology is completely contradictory to their will to live freely and independently, as individuals whose nationality is a component of their personal integrity." He added that "the very existence of a Leninist state means not only violation, but also continual denial of fundamental human rights: It reduces individuals to weaponry, to the building material for that society." According to Bucar, "the struggle against Leninist tyranny requires that use be made of all possible means to force it to become in practice what it advocates in theory—that it become truly democratic."

We interpreted this as an appeal to the West to apply economic, political, and other pressure in support of Dr. Bucar and all like-minded people "with all possible means." This is our interpretation in view of the direct connections and continuity in terms of time and subject, and the recent statements by Ivan Oman, president of the Farmers Union of Slovenia, who, according to reports by the Austrian press, has said that Western aid to Yugoslavia is not beneficial, since it only "prolongs the agony of the leadership in Belgrade," or more specifically, "the agony of the system that is incapable of survival."

We will leave these open appeals to foreigners to intervene in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia without comment, certain that the quotes themselves provide an answer to all questions about their authors and their goals. It is understandable that we, as fellow citizens of these "critics" who are doing us, as a state, a great deal of harm abroad, are overcome by a feeling of profound uneasiness; nevertheless, these appeals should not concern us too much. Because the foreign circles to which

they are addressed know all too well that intervention in the sovereign laws of a state, which the persons mentioned are challenging them to engage in, is not in keeping with international law, nor with the real circumstances of international relations, nor with their genuine interests. Moreover, they know that the cold war is over.

Law on Work Relations With Foreigners Amended

90EB0095B Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST in Serbo-Croatian No. 64 20 Oct 89 pp 1589-1590

[Text] 979. On the basis of article 315, section 3 of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY], the SFRY Presidency hereby issues a

Decree on Proclamation of the Law on Changes and Additions to the Law on the Conditions for the Establishment of Work Relations With Foreign Citizens

The Law on Changes and Additions to the Law on the Conditions for the Establishment of Work Relations With Foreign Citizens which was passed by the SFRY Assembly at a meeting of the Federal Council on 19 October 1989 is hereby issued.

P No. 1069 Belgrade, 19 October 1989

President of the SFRY Presidency Dr. Janez Drnovsek
President of the SFRY Assembly Dr. Slobodan Gligoric

Law on Changes and Additions to the Law on the Conditions for the Establishment of Work Relations With Foreign Citizens

Article 1

In the Law on the Conditions for the Establishment of Work Relations With Foreign Citizens (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ No. 11/78), Article 1 is changed to read:

"A foreign citizen and a person without citizenship (hereinafter 'foreign citizen') can establish work relations with an enterprise, an organization for public activities, a bank or other financial organization, an insurance organization, a cooperative, and other forms of cooperation and joint business with a foreign person (hereinafter 'organization'), and also with a working person who independently conducts activity through personal labor, or through personal labor and resources owned by citizens, or with a civil legal physical person, an agricultural farm, a representation of a foreign firm, and a diplomatic and consular representation in the SFRY (hereinafter 'employer'), if he satisfies the general conditions established by law, collective contract, or general act (statute, rules, or other self-managing general act) for performing the work of the job for which the work relationship is being established, and the special conditions established by this law."

Article 2

In Article 2, after paragraph 1, a new paragraph 2 is added, which reads:

"A foreign citizen can establish work relations with an organization or employer, without approval for the establishment of the work relations cited in paragraph 1 of this article, and without public announcement, if he has approval for temporary or permanent residence in the SFRY and if the work relations are based on the performance of professional work established by a contract for commercial and technical cooperation, for long-term production cooperation, for technology transfer, or for foreign investments."

The former paragraph 2, which becomes paragraph 3, is changed to read:

"A general act of the organization establishes, in accordance with the law, the jobs in which foreign citizens can be employed."

After paragraph 3, a paragraph 4 is added, which reads:

"The organization or employer is required to provide the republic or provincial organization responsible for employment affairs information on the number, structure, and duration of the work relations of the foreign citizens in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, in accordance with the regulations on records in the area of labor."

Article 3

In article 3, after the word "submits," the words "to the republic or provincial organization responsible for employment affairs" are added, and the remainder of the text is deleted.

Article 4

Article 4 is changed to read:

"A request for issuing approval for the establishment of a work relationship of a foreign citizen who has approval for temporary residence in the SFRY is submitted by the organization or employer, with an explanation of the need for the employment of the foreign citizen. The request is submitted to the republic or provincial organization responsible for employment affairs."

Article 5

Article 5, paragraph 1 is changed to read:

"Approval for the establishment of a work relationship with a foreign citizen is given by the republic or provincial organization responsible for employment affairs."

Paragraph 4 is changed to read:

"The submitter of the request for issuing approval for the establishment of a work relationship can submit an appeal against the decision in paragraph 1 of this article within a period of 15 days from the date of the delivery of the decision. The appeal is submitted to the body designated by the statute of the republic or provincial organization responsible for employment affairs."

Article 6

Article 6 is changed to read:

"A foreign citizen establishes a work relationship on the day that he begins work on the basis of a decision on his appointment or a labor contract."

Article 7

In Article 7, the words "or with a working person who independently conducts activity through personal labor with resources owned by citizens, a working person who conducts professional activity through personal labor independently in the form of a profession, or a civil legal person," are replaced by the words "or an employer."

Article 8

In Article 8, the words "a working person who independently conducts activity through personal labor with resources owned by citizens, a working person who conducts professional activity through personal labor independently in the form of a profession, or a civil legal person" are replaced by the word "employer."

After paragraph 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 are added, which read:

"The work relationship is extended for a foreign citizen whose temporary residence in the SFRY has been extended and who has been given a new approval for the establishment of a work relationship."

"The work relationship for a foreign citizen who establishes a work relationship on the basis of a contract under article 2, paragraph 2, ceases on the day of the termination of the contract."

Article 9

Article 9 is changed to read:

"The organization or employer can conclude a contract with a foreign citizen for performing temporary and occasional work, for a period that cannot be longer than three months in the calendar year, under the conditions established by law and general act for the performance of that work by a citizen of the SFRY."

Article 10

Article 10 is changed to read:

"An organization or employer will be punished for a misdemeanor by a monetary fine of 5,000,000 to 25,000,000 dinars:

"1) if it establishes a work relationship with a foreign citizen contrary to the provisions of Articles 2 through 5 of this law;

"2) if it establishes a work relationship with a foreign citizen contrary to the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of this law."

"The responsible person in the organization or at the employer will be punished for a misdemeanor under paragraph 1 of this article by a monetary fine of 2,000,000 to 10,000,000 dinars."

Article 11

This law will come into force on the 8th day from the date of its publication in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

First Independent Trade Union To Be Formed

90EB0149B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
7 Nov 89 pp 38-39

[Article by Milan Becejic: "Wind of Democratization"]

[Text] Even if it has not been permitted in politics, partnership is possible at the level of writers' associations. Precisely such an association is in sight in Belgrade, and the inspiration for its founding came from Mirko Kovac, Filip David, Zivojin Pavlovic, and Vidosav Stevanovic, who are currently literarily non-aligned writers in Belgrade. The fact that they have lost their patience with this situation—of bitterly feuding writers' associations that consistently follow the political intolerance of their national bureaucracies—can also be seen from how little time passed between the publication of their idea and the intention to implement it.

"We will probably hold our inaugural meeting as early as this month," says Filip David. "We are currently at the stage of drafting a Statute, and in a few days we will also submit a request for registration. It may happen that we will not get it immediately, but we will exist, work, and seek it until we are allowed to do it. We do not want to establish ties with any political or social association. Our founding is therefore in and of itself a demonstration vis-a-vis all the existing forms of the association of artists, as well as the relations prevailing in them. We are not concealing our intention to have the Association grow into an independent trade union, not only for writers, but also for all other artists. Even now there is great interest among writers, and it will not be difficult for us to secure the legal minimum of 10 people in order for us to register."

One can sense from talking with the fathers of the new Association that this "coalition," even though those interested include writers from the entire country, will not be based on Yugoslavism, but rather on intellectual affinities and the closeness of artistic and political views. There are three goals that the Association should achieve: "The voluntary association of a number of Yugoslav writers on the basis of intellectual affinities; the initiation of the legal administrative procedure for establishing a strong and effective writers' trade union, which would represent the interests of writers before the state and all political organizations; support for a society of independent individuals in which civil and artistic freedoms will be consistently respected, protected by law, and guaranteed."

Not a Transmission Belt for Current Politics

"There is too much irregularity with respect to the status of writers," says Mirko Kovac. "Among other things, there are problems with taxes, authors' fees, the attitude of publishers... Naturally, these are not simple problems whose solution would not be affected by politics. Independently of the ideological context, we will not allow writers and other artists to be manipulated. We will react to anything that threatens their integrity and creative freedom."

It seems that the creation of the Association will act as a healing balm on wounds from harsh words, primarily for those writers who long ago or more recently left their parent associations, and also for those who have been drawn against their will into increasingly more dangerous quasi-intellectual, or rather, interethnic skirmishes (just because they are members of one republic or provincial association or another).

The harshest in condemning the existing writers' associations is Zivojin Pavlovic, who claims that the Yugoslav Writers' Federation is based on the Russian model and that it has been controlled for years, which is quite evident from practice. "We want a Yugoslav trade association that would be above all political and ethnic divisions and that would protect the interests of writers," he says.

"Today a writer has to take a position on nationalism, just as a writer in fascist Germany, for instance, had to react to fascism," Kovac states categorically. "Each of us is an individual, and must and can express this in an equal dialogue. Our Association will not have any ideological guidelines or antagonism. That is the only way that we can avoid being a transmission belt for current politics."

This statement by Kovac clearly contains a condemnation of the existing writers' associations, whose activity, programs, and conduct are becoming increasingly tied to the political credo of their own leadership, or resemble it too much. In that regard, the very courteous reactions of literary emissaries from other regions, who obviously do not want to give false assessments, are a little surprising. Most of the writers queried see the literary and personal reputation of the four founders of the new Association as a guarantee of the success of this "highly esthetic idea." For Ante Popovski, the president of the Macedonian writers, the initiative has considerable prospects for development, since the "wind of democratization has been delayed in the ranks of writers." Somewhat more reservations have been expressed by Nedeljko Fabio, the president of the Croatian Writers' Society. He does not have anything against such ideas if they do not harm the existing societies and associations. Obviously the new Association will be directed against the present writers' organizations, not because that would be its intention and planned task, but by the nature of things—it simply rises above the present organizational creations of our writers in both the ethical and the social sense. That can

also be seen from a statement by Oto Tolnai, a probable future representative of the Yugoslav Writers' Federation, and now the chairman of the Vojvodina Writers' Society. He ranks this idea among the most important events in the intellectual life of Yugoslavia. "I am happy, because I have also been seeking a departure in similar directions," says Tolnai; this may also be an indication that if there is an opportunity he will change his literary environment.

Beckovic's Reservations

Somewhat more cautious than the rest was Slobodan Selenic, the chairman of the Yugoslav Writers' Federation. He does not believe that there will be a great response in these times, and thinks that that response will be the least precisely in this part of Yugoslavia with which the four writers want to restore the broken ties. Selenic was obviously thinking of Serbia, but immediately replaced his ill omens with great interest in the fate of this initiative.

Our first impression is that the new idea will "fall" hardest on the heart and soul of the Serbian Writers' Association [UKS], because in a way it was "born" as a counterweight to it. Judging by the first statements by Matija Beckovic, the president of this UKS, there should be no obstruction and disagreement between the two associations from the same territory. Beckovic even gallantly offered the "beginners" the premises of the UKS, "since the building in which the UKS is located belongs to all writers." Beckovic has shown that he has some reservations about the idea of his four colleagues in the form of doubt that an independent association will be capable of solving professional problems when that can hardly be done even by these present ones, which are, as Beckovic says without reluctance, an "extension of the authorities" and members of the Socialist Alliance.

The first independent trade union in Yugoslavia is about to be "put into operation." It is not very important whether that operation is only professionally oriented, or perhaps also socially and politically. The fundamental thing is that it will not be unidirectional and narrowly channeled, like the operation regulated by the existing writers' associations.

Serbian Official Describes Pressures on Judges

90EB0153A Belgrade NON in Serbo-Croatian
15 Oct 89 pp 15-17

[Interview with Dragan Saponjic, secretary of the Republic of Serbia for jurisprudence and administration, by Sasa Vucinic: "The Pressures Are Highly Refined"; date and place not given]

[Text] NON: Over the last year the most popular word in political newspeak is undoubtedly the "law-governed state." Do you, as the minister of jurisprudence, think that in spite of all the verbal oaths that have been taken

over the last year that we have moved even one step closer to the law-governed state?

[Saponjic] I think we have. I do not know whether it is a whole step or half a step, but we are certainly closer to the law-governed state. There are several elements on the legislative side which signify a step forward for this society. I think that the amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution and especially the amendments to the Constitution of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia constitute a step in that direction. But that is only the normative aspect.

I think that that other part of the legal order, its realization, has also taken a step forward. The overall social climate has changed. Public scrutiny of official actions has helped to considerably improve realization of the legal order as well. And the performance of government bodies is under the broadest public scrutiny, which is always essential to achievement of the legal order and the law-governed state. But perhaps we do need a bit higher legal standards for greater realization of the principle of the law-governed state. But in this area we probably still have to start from scratch.

The Firmness of the Judge—The Obligation of the Entire Society

NON: Jurisprudence is undoubtedly the most important pillar of the law-governed state. But we have unfortunately discredited and compromised it...especially the honorable calling of the judge....

[Saponjic] First, as far as the courts are concerned, at least those regular courts, I would never dare to give them bad marks. This is why: I still think that all the facts with respect to the realization of judicial protection, when there is a violation of human freedom and rights or property rights, indicate that an immense number of such cases receive very effective, successful and legal protection in the courts. But this is taken for granted....

NON: But that is the way it ought to be in all cases....

[Saponjic] Of course. Every individual case which does not get tried when it should or especially if there is suspicion that the decision of the court has been subject to the influence and perhaps even pressure of the "side that is stronger" not in terms of the law, in which case it should win in the courts, but the "side that is stronger" with respect to other elements of some form or another of social power, then this really evokes a justified reaction and takes on great proportions, so that we forget what normally and really happens with the immense majority of cases. That is why I draw the general conclusion that the courts in this country and this Republic of Serbia operate lawfully. From the objective standpoint, it would be hard to reproach them.

NON: Have you as the minister of justice had a case when a judge complained to you that he was being pressured?

[Saponjic] I have mentioned "social power," using this broadest term. Nevertheless, then, from time to time a case occurs that draws public attention and it is said that there has been pressure, that the decisions are unlawful, even that there is collusion and string-pulling.... I think that the court, as an institution of society, must first be objectively placed in the system so that its independence can be achieved in the first place. This is the first prerequisite for realization of the law-governed state. What does this mean in specific terms? The court must have a position with respect to the election of judges, the discharge of judges, the financing of the court as an institution, and the financing for the salaries of judges, so that all of that results in its objectively independent social position. Viewed both from the standpoint of the individual and from the social standpoint.

Here are the actual figures: We have today an opstina judge who receives a salary of 500 million old dinars. So, on 500 million he is supposed to support his family, and he must be so morally firm, he must have such a character that he does not give in to any temptation. But it is in the nature of things for people to take advantage of everything. I put the question: What society would expect that a man who is paid below the average for his environment will be able to mete out justice, be independent and self-sufficient, and not be subject to any influence whatsoever? Is the judge to bear sole responsibility for that, or the entire society? He must be so firm in morality and character to withstand all that and to try cases and mete out justice in a local environment among the people whom he meets everyday on the street. And who will be accountable when something else happens—that judge will be accountable. I nevertheless think that the creation of objective conditions for the independence of judges is above all the business of society if it wants to have independent courts. That is why we in Serbia, during the period of these very difficult economic conditions, have moved the election of judges out of the local environment, so that the election of all judges, even opstina judges, will be done by the Serbian Assembly. And the courts will be financed out of the republic budget, so there will be no judges who receive 500 million in one opstina, while their colleagues in another opstina, but in the same region, receive 2 billion. Up to now, that is, that ratio has been 1:4. We will not, of course, make salaries absolutely equal. Nor on the other hand do we promise that the judges will have the highest salaries in the republic.

The Pressures Are More Subtle

NON: That is objective, and what is subjective?

[Saponjic] The judge is also a human being. He is a specialist, he is equipped to apply the law, and he is a man of high moral attributes and is respected in the environment in which he tries cases. Precisely because of the position jurisprudence has had up to now in our society we have largely had negative personnel selection for years. Those people who have acquired professional knowledge and who can offer the most have been leaving

the courts. They have been going into the business world, where they can earn much more, where they can get an apartment.... Those who have remained are those with particular dedication, those who are in love with the profession, and those who are unable to leave. And others have been coming, those who have been waiting to gain professional competence and to seize the first opportunity to leave. So, what lies ahead of us—more accurately, it has already begun—is a very serious differentiation in our courts, but a differentiation exclusively based on moral attributes, work performance, and professional competence. We will insist that only those who meet these three criteria at the highest level will be in the courts and will be hired to work there.

NON: Let us go back once again to the pressures on the court and on judges....

[Saponjic] I think that there are no open pressures to speak of.

NON: Which means that no judge has ever complained to you that pressure has been put on him?

[Saponjic] No. There has been no such case of open pressure when someone "in the government" or "in politics" has said to him "You have to decide this way, and if you do not, we do such and so." We have, after all, gone too far in developing civilized standards to exert pressure like that. There are pressures, but they are much more subtle. They are exerted in a refined fashion and in the most diverse ways: by pointing a finger, by criticizing the court or the judge for something quite different.... These are rather serious pressures. Sometimes the local authorities use the occasion of examining a report on the performance of the court (which is a quite normal procedure anyway) to exert pressure on the court, as much as to say "No, no, you will do what we say, or we will give you bad marks in the report." And it is particularly dangerous when technical matters that arise in the work of the court begin to be debated by political organizations, such as, for example, when the opstina committee of the League of Communists examines a particular case of a judge's action and issues a political-ideological assessment of it. I consider this direct pressure on the work of the court, since in a law-governed state the decision of the court may be examined and evaluated only and solely by the higher court. And we have a case where an opstina committee of the party has required that the court submit monthly reports on a particular type of case. This requirement was "incorporated" in the conclusions of that committee and stood over the signature and stamp of its most responsible people. This is not direct pressure, but it constitutes political control over the work of the court, and once again it destroys the law-governed state.

The Courts and the Party

NON: Can your secretariat and you personally do anything to combat such actions? Has any party secretary been removed because of such an action?

[Saponjic] I think that the reaction to that kind of behavior must above all be political and channeled through the official bodies of sociopolitical organizations, which at the level of the republic have always had a different attitude on this matter. That is, this is above all a local relationship. And by moving the court outside the influence of local government authorities, we have been solving this problem. So, centralization was not our motive, but rather to create the conditions for an independent judicial system through these changes in the way the courts are organized. That was our true intention. But since party organizations also operate in the courts, there have been cases when interpersonal conflicts occur in the court, in those party organizations, working groups, and office parties they begin to discuss the trial and the question of whether this or that is proper or not, which again jeopardizes the court's independence. We had such a case in Pirot. For, to repeat once more, only and solely the higher court can and should evaluate the decision of a lower court, not some office party or working group, whatever it may be.

NON: Now that we have mentioned the party...its separation from the state has been talked about for years. The LCY is a sociopolitical organization, but the court is a government body. Again—is it suitable to pose the question of whether there are judges who are not members of the party?

[Saponjic] There are.

NON: Their percentage, I assume, is minimal?

[Saponjic] That percentage is small, but not so small that we might say that it does not count.... It would be precise to say that the number of judges who are not members of the LCY is quite small, but they do exist....

NON: The next logical question is whether the judge who is a member of the party is independent when he decides a case on which the political organization to which he belongs has taken a political position. And he, following the principle of democratic centralism, is required to respect that position....

[Saponjic] The judge must be independent, since he is applying the law in the court, not the positions and directives of the political organization to which he belongs. If the will of that political force has not been incorporated into the law, then it should fight to have its political will incorporated into the law. Since our laws were not adopted apart from the influence of the League of Communists, in applying the law the judge is also applying the will of that leading ideological force. And to that point all is well. Any application of a political directive, resolution, position, or party decision in deliberation is lawlessness.

Isolation

NON: One of the best-known Belgrade lawyers has been persistently advocating the theory that judges should be prohibited from taking part in any political organization,

since the judge must be absolutely objective, and by simply belonging to any political organization the judge is declaring his position in advance....

[Saponjic] This view is well-known to me. I think that it goes to the extreme. I think there is no system in the world which prohibits the judge from taking a position and thinking in political terms. The general commitment that members of the League of Communists cannot be judges is likewise extreme, since that would mean denying these people their civil right to be politically active. Nor is that necessary, because the judge is not acting politically in the court, but is applying the law. If he applies it mistakenly, then the higher court must correct it.

And the fact that the judge belongs to a particular political party must not be a condition for his taking up that post, but neither can it be the grounds for disqualifying him as a judge.

NON: What about isolation? More accurately—the use of force toward certain people who were in “isolation....”

[Saponjic] The Secretariat for Internal Affairs has obtained certain information to the effect that there were certain irregularities in administration of the measure of isolation. I personally have not received a single complaint from a citizen of this republic that action was improper on such an occasion. I have had occasion to read such statements in the newspaper, I have seen people on television who were in isolation and who had complaints of irregularities. That, of course, also qualifies as information, and I use it, but officially I have not received a single complaint that any citizen was abused or beaten.

However, since we have ascertained that certain details in connection with the use of force are nevertheless unclear, I ordered that the captains of the guards be removed immediately, and they were replaced for two reasons. First, we must not allow a recurrence of anything like that if it did happen, and second, although, at least for the present, there are no indications that the captains of the guards were directly involved in the use of force, it was their duty to see that nothing like that happened, and now they must take the objective responsibility.

We have been very interested in ascertaining the truth. It is clear that the guards do not carry sticks as a decoration, but in order to use them, but in circumstances that are defined in strict terms. A report must be filed on every use of force, and this must be done immediately after such a case occurs. Since we have not had a report to the effect that force was used, we logically doubt that the use was lawful, and that is why we removed the captains of the guards. Disciplinary proceedings have already been conducted in the first instance, and according to its finding there was no abuse. The republic commission, of course, vacated that finding. Criminal proceedings have also been instituted, that is, an inquiry, against all those persons who were in contact with the

people in isolation. The inquiry should show whether there are grounds for an indictment or not. Now, it is up to the people who were in isolation to make statements—when and where force was applied, who are the people who applied it, so that the prosecutor could determine whether and whom to prosecute. One thing is certain, if there was unlawfulness, there will be both disciplinary and criminal accountability. The state certainly will not stand behind such actions.

NON: Finally, do you and your secretariat have any powers whatsoever concerning the trial of Azem Vllasi? I am thinking of the complaints of his wife concerning the attitude of prison authorities toward him....

[Saponjic] The republic secretariat has no power whatsoever in this case. That is a matter for the District Court in Titova Mitrovica.

Disqualification of Serbian Youth Candidates Criticized

90EB0149A *Belgrade NON in Serbo-Croatian*
5 Nov 89 p 6

[Article by Milutin Dzinovic: "First Serbian Election Scandal"]

[Text] Immediately before the completion of this issue, we learned that the Republic Electoral Commission had challenged the right of candidates from the Serbian Socialist Youth League [SSO] in the republic assembly to be older than 27. This legal interpretation of the youth league statute probably has yet to be discussed, but the political consequences of this decision the day before the printing of the ballots are already becoming obvious....

Exactly one week remains until the day when the citizens of Serbia come out for what officials at all possible levels are assuring us will be free and democratic elections, for the first time. The citizens' response and the results of the voting can be expected to show their real political mood. Nevertheless, even according to (directed) news reports on certain elections which were completed in the last few days, the citizens are becoming more and more convinced that they will attend and participate in one more—at least, so far—very skillful electoral production.

One can also see that this is the case from the fact that the opposing candidates to the officials (planned) to be elected in the end were mainly outsiders, or—something that has probably not yet been observed in the world—simply implored people not to vote for them. That is probably a newly acquired democratic right of candidates, and one more contribution to our claims that we are a unique and independent society.

If the current authorities wanted to gain legitimacy through the elections, then, in view of the procedure used to arrive at the list of candidates on the ballots, they can hardly boast of it, for the simple reason that they did not meet the elementary condition that along with free nomination, there should be no intermediary between

the nominator and the voter. Naturally, there has not been any mention of the institutionalization of special interest groups that along with their programs would also propose candidates and agitate for them.

Disputed Candidates

In the situation of the absence of formal democracy (institutionalized, because the form is a condition for the content), the Serbian SSO was the only one to try to follow a truly democratic and modern procedure for electing its representatives in the assemblies of the sociopolitical communities. In that procedure, the SSO went beyond its narrow definition as a "political organization of young people up to 27 years old," and opened itself up to all people through its ideas and political platform as expressed in the Serbian SSO's Electoral Program.

Thanks to the Electoral Law and the rules of the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP], of the 30 candidates that the Serbian SSO PK [Political Committee] chose at its 25 October meeting and requested to be on the ballots for the election of 15 delegates to the Sociopolitical Council of the Serbian Assembly, only 18 remained after the Republic Conference of the Serbian SAWP reduced that list at its 27 October meeting. One more innovation! Imagine, esteemed readers—an organization that you also form part of determines who will represent you in the highest government body of the Serbian Socialist Republic.

The warning at the end of the article in the last issue of NON about the meeting of the Serbian SSO PK ("Good Morning, Democracy") unfortunately proved correct, and much earlier than could have been expected. The delegates who are to represent the Serbian SSO in the Serbian Assembly and who were selected on the basis of a political program (for freedom of political association, for the equality of forms of property, and for a federal Yugoslavia integrated into Europe) were challenged even before their names had gotten on the ballots. The Republic Electoral Commission, as we have learned, a day before the printing of the ballots, challenged the right of the Serbian SSO's candidates to be older than 27. According to the Serbian SSO's Statute, a member of the SSO can also be a member of the youth organization after 27, if he wishes this and if the basic organization so decides. In addition to this individual membership, collective membership (of an organization) also exists under the Serbian SSO's Statute. Collective members, and the membership within them, have all the rights of the membership in the basic organizations of the SSO. So much for the Statute. From the legal point of view, one can hardly challenge the right of people older than 27 to be delegate candidates for the Serbian SSO, naturally, if they meet one of the two above-mentioned conditions.

Who Will Represent Youth?

Obviously, this is not a question of law, but of politics. Apparently the elite political circles followed very closely

everything written in the Serbian SSO's electoral program, everything written in the program self-candidacies, and everything said at the 27 October meeting of the Serbian SSO PK [date as published]. The Serbian political elite, which would like to have the youth organization continue to be merely its natural progeny and a political ornament, does not favor the growth of a new political partner that shows that it has proposals for resolving the crisis, and the courage to proclaim them and enter into a political struggle to implement them. Obviously, it is very essential to keep capable, educated, brave, responsible, and politically prepared people out of the Assembly benches. The elite would rather see inexperienced and naive young people as the youth league's delegates. Clearly it would be much easier to rule in spite of them.

Although it is not yet known, as this issue of NON is being printed, whether the 12 November ballots will

contain the names of the Serbian SSO's candidates (it has been proposed that they not be on it), one thing is nevertheless clear: a fear for power has arisen, a fear of new people, and a fear that the established unity may be disrupted by the introduction of a new political program in the Serbian Assembly. That is good. It is, finally, an opportunity for the Serbian SSO to justify its existence and to prove its legitimacy to some extent; it is also proof of the increased strength of the Serbian SSO. It is up to the republic youth leadership to use its present strength and to become a champion and initiator of the development of democracy. If the Serbian SSO's candidates are not on the 12 November ballots, Serbia will enter an unprecedented political crisis, and the elections will also lose that part of their legitimacy that the youth organization provided them through the means of their participation. The Serbian SSO will not be the one responsible for such a course of events and for their consequences.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Stolen Profits Sought in Waste 'Import' Scheme

90EG0102A East Berlin BAUERN ECHO in German
5 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Bodo Marks: "Where Are the Millions From the Waste Imports?"]

[Text] Even our party members are now discussing the topic of the disposal of imported waste. Alluding to the dumps in Schoenberg, Gresvesmuehlen kreis and in the Potsdam district, they ask whether the GDR is supposed to become a dumping ground for the West. They also want to know what is being financed by the foreign exchange earned by this waste disposal. On behalf of the secretariat of the Haldensleben kreis board, these same questions also preoccupy that board's first secretary. BAUERN ECHO sought and obtained an interview at the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management to find out how to answer these questions.

To begin with: The shipment of waste to other countries is an internationally accepted practice. It is another question entirely whether this procedure is always appropriate and beneficial for the country concerned. Such dumps are often disputed, because neither the project nor the data on the protection of the environment and of the ground water were disclosed to the public. Treaties and agreements between the GDR and other countries regulate the border crossing transportation and harmless elimination of waste from foreign countries. What is the situation with regard to specific cases?

A contract concluded on 11 December 1974 by the Intrac Trading Company on the one hand and the West Berlin Berlin Consult firm on the other provides for the reception of waste from West Berlin. On the basis of this contract, household garbage, construction, and industrial waste are received and dumped in Potsdam district. The contract has a term of 20 years. In view of its situation, West Berlin has only severely limited opportunities for establishing dumps or other disposal facilities. The transportation of garbage from West Berlin to the FRG would be unacceptable to both parties. In other words, it is not hard to understand the situation.

Regulations on the type and composition of the waste were agreed upon with the West Berliners. Specific limits for the amount of pollutants in the waste handled may not be exceeded. Many types of waste are generally excluded from reception by the GDR. They include radioactive materials as well as any toxins as defined in the GDR toxin law. No waste materials qualifying as "toxic" or "toxic garbage" are delivered.

Since 1980, household garbage and industrial waste from abroad have been dumped at the Schoenberg dump. Here also, the appropriate contracts were concluded between the Intrac Trading Company and foreign firms in the FRG, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland.

The hydrological conditions at this dump guarantee that no pollutants enter the ground water of the tertiary layer. Expert opinions by geologists have proved this. In view of its geological, hydrological, and technological condition, the Schoenberg dump meets all international criteria for a sound dump. Experts state that it is by far one of the safest dumps in Central Europe.

The Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management set the "terms for the reception of waste materials" at the dump in 1980. According to this regulation, 15 groups of waste are excluded from disposal here (instance toxic garbage and radioactive materials, for instance). Waste with a pollutant content in excess of the permissible upper limit is not accepted either. Each year up to 40-50 vehicles are refused entry. At the same time the dump management threatens the offenders with cancellation of the contract in case of a repeat. When a vehicle arrives, the laboratory immediately examines the load with respect to five parameters. During that time the vehicle may not be unloaded. More tests, involving 46 parameters, are carried out later. It has never yet happened that waste needed to be returned following these tests.

In order to check the surface waters, water samples are extracted monthly and tested in accordance with 56 criteria, including chlorine and nitrate content, pH value and conductivity. The test results state that the water quality has not changed since the dump was established.

Underground conditions are checked by means of 48 gauges in the vicinity and 15 gauges at the dump site itself, at depths ranging from 3-120 meters. Samples drawn quarterly confirm that the ground water is not being contaminated by pollutants. According to current scientific-technological standards, therefore, there is no danger.

A million tons of waste materials are dumped in Schoenberg each year. That represents some two percent of all such materials produced in the GDR, in other words a relatively small amount.

Nowhere in the world are there services that do not have to be paid for. That certainly applies to imported waste dumped in the GDR. BAUERN ECHO asked Bernd Reise, deputy manager of the State Environmental Inspectorate, whether it was true that some M 80-100 million are earned annually by the reception and dumping of garbage. Reise said that this was so.

Where is this money? We wanted to have exact information. The Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management does not get a penny. We were told that waste imports are dealt with commercially by trading companies, the ministry is concerned only with checking the waste products to be received and dumped.

We insisted on further information: Who is actually paid? The reporters were told that the "commercial coordination," mentioned several times before, gets the

money. It used to be headed by Dr. Schalck-Golodkowski who has disappeared and is now being sought by the authorities.

Did the ministry at any time receive money from this agency, enabling it to import modern environmental control equipment? Foreign exchange was made available in only two instances. One was the establishment of the measuring network in Schoeneiche, the other the purchase of foil for dumps in Karl-Marx-Stadt.

The Ministry for the Environment therefore was not more than an applicant at this ominous commercial facility? The reporters were told that this was so. Why was all the foreign exchange earned by the dumping of imported wastes not made available for environmental control? Our question was not answered, and we were annoyed by this failure. The general public as well as all of us demand to be told what was financed by this foreign exchange.

BAUERN ECHO appeals to:

Our colleague Wilhelm Weissgaerber, member of the People's Chamber and deputy chairman of the temporary People's Chamber committee for examining cases of official misconduct, corruption, personal enrichment, and other actions, asking him to examine the channels into which these foreign exchange funds flowed.

BAUERN ECHO demands:

To prosecute those who allowed these foreign exchange moneys to be taken away from environmental control. We consider it imperative to instruct the state prosecutor general.

BAUERN ECHO demands:

To immediately make available to the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management all foreign exchange earned by the storage of imported wastes, so that modern environmental equipment may be imported. We can no longer tolerate a situation of a ministry doing the work while questionable commercial facilities receive and distribute the money.

Decay in Residential Units Outlined

90EG0111B Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
Vol 44 No 2, 8 Jan 90 pp 75-79

[Article by Hermann Bott, SPIEGEL editor: "Soon There Won't Be Anything Left To Save"]

[Text] The pigeons live in the attic apartments. Below, in front of the ground floor, boards protect the pedestrians against falling masonry. Until 1985, 12 families lived at 27 Windscheidstrasse in Leipzig-Connewitz. Now there are only three—one on the second floor and two on the ground floor.

The house withstood 40 years of socialism better than the incendiary bomb that went through the roof in 1943.

"It is a catastrophe," complains Guenter Roessler, a tenant on the second floor. "Nothing has been done here since the end of the war."

The house, as so many in the GDR, was deserted from the top to the bottom. Because the water seeps through everywhere, the tenants under the roof are the first to move out. Then, after the ceilings on the fifth floor have become wet, the inhabitants abandon the fifth floor and soon after that the fourth is empty. The last to go are those from the ground floor.

The Roesslers will also soon have to give up their four-room apartment (105 square meters, rent 96 marks). Since 1967, "with massive petitions," Guenter and Ursula Roessler have pointed out the increasing deterioration of the house to the city district construction office, the district mayor, the sanitation office and their responsible SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] representative. Only once, eight years ago, did a construction team show up. They secured the sidewalk with boards. That was it. The first apartment was abandoned four years later.

Just as on Windscheidstrasse, once a nice middle-class area, the old structures are rotting everywhere in the GDR and entire blocks deteriorate to the point where they are unliveable. Many tenants, like mechanic Joachim Saupe from the second floor of 38 Kochstrasse in Leipzig, are "afraid that the house will fall on their heads."

It takes a long time, often two to three years, until a house is completely gone to seed. But once the deterioration starts, everything goes very quickly. The old structures began to rot throughout the territory of the GDR in the 1980's.

The West German city planner Helmut Holzbauer, who is advising the people in Eisenach in their urban renewal, has already had bad experiences. In Eisenach, according to Holzbauer, 20-25 percent of the houses are so deteriorated that they can no longer be preserved. The situation is no better in many other municipalities of the GDR.

In Karl-Marx-Stadt, the former Chemnitz, Kassberg was once a preferred residential area. Stately, generally four to five-story houses, predominantly with seven and eight-room apartments, were built there between 1895 and 1910.

Today the once popular area is in a horrible state. "The critical phase in which the quarter capsizes and soon nothing more can be saved is now beginning here," says civil engineer Ingolf Ross from Karl-Marx-Stadt.

There is still one tenant living in a large old structure, 14 Weststrasse. Andreas Frank moved in there five years ago. The electrical lines were laid there at that time. The roof was supposed to be repaired and the facade and the balconies reconstructed.

But no craftsman has appeared there in five years. Meanwhile, the balconies may not be used because of the danger of collapse, the fallen plaster lies on the staircase and the water splashes out of defective downpipes against the wall of the house.

Franke still has a halfway dry dwelling: "The rain only comes into the neighboring apartments." But it is clear to him that he cannot stay long. Every week he reports to his landlord, the VEB [state enterprise] Building Management Karl-Marx-Stadt, and asks about an apartment: "I have been in the plan for two years."

No one knows when Franke can move. Three million apartments were built in two decades—much too few for a state that from the beginning has been unable to provide fully for its citizens in this area.

The ruling SED had repeatedly promised that by 1990 every citizen of the GDR could move into an apartment of his choice. But today the economically ruined state is farther from this goal than ever.

As a matter of fact, everything has become worse. The old structures disintegrated while the construction brigades put up monstrous new residential structures. Production records can be celebrated only with new buildings and thus not enough money flowed into the maintenance of the existing structures.

Not much was modernized and often even that was done in an arbitrary manner. Thus, for example, plumbers put into apartments toilets that had previously been in the staircase between the floors. In the case of the six-member Skrzypek family at 41 Rudolf-Harlass-Strasse in Karl-Marx-Stadt, the toilet is now in the kitchen, in the former pantry next to the sink. The party press in recent years has even called such remodeling an "improvement of the living value." Meanwhile, there was increasing resentment in the population about the catastrophic provision of housing and there was also more animosity toward foreigners—"all the Poles, Vietnamese, and Cubans get the nice new apartments," complains a woman in Leipzig.

To be sure, the new high-rise settlements show a disconsolate lack of imagination but the apartments are in great demand: they offer, as they say in GDR-German, "full comfort with remote heat and a central supply of hot water. To be sure, they are somewhat close quarters. The standard three-room apartment has 48 square meters and for a four-member family, as in Leipzig-Gruenau, GDR architects conjure up four and a half rooms along with kitchen, hall and bathroom in 65 square meters.

So in Karl-Marx-Stadt, then, the Skrzypeks moved from their new three-room apartment with remote heat to a three-room apartment in an old building with stove heating. There they have 95 square meters—twice as much room—but it is still too little for a married couple, two children, a daughter-in-law and a grandchild.

The family has been looking for appropriate housing for years. Art Nouveau houses and magnificent brick villas stand empty throughout the quarter: they have been "freed"—the tenants were dislodged from their quarters. Tens of thousands of the "freed" houses stand idle in the cities of the GDR with their rotting ceilings and rotten window frames.

Perhaps sometime the craftsmen will come to renovate the buildings. Or the VEB Building Management will wait until an entire block is ready to be torn down.

The decay always begins with the same symptoms, civil engineer Ross explains: "First the gutter on the roof gets clogged up, then the downpipe bursts in winter and water seeps into the walls." Such minor damage is ignored in the initial stage and then, when the damage is obvious, there are no craftsmen and building materials.

A district administrator of the Leipzig Building Management relates how money for repairs disappears. Craftsmen could not be found and so he still had 200,000 marks in the cash box at the end of the year. He was still able to give out the money according to plan: for 6,000 to 12,000 marks in each case, he bought the heating systems from the tenants who had gas floor heating installed at their own expense.

"I do not know how we are supposed to handle the problem," resigns the administrator. The stock of run-down nationalized buildings is increasing constantly: private owners are continually giving houses to the building management "and then we have to deal with the junk."

Private owners—there are still many of them in the GDR—are unable to maintain their houses. The regulated rent is about 1 mark per square meter and the receipts do not even allow temporary repair of the houses.

Socialism also had its good aspects, grumbled Politburo member Kurt Hager bitterly when he lost his offices after the revolution: "the low rent" was one of the greatest accomplishments of the SED.

As a matter of fact, the grotesquely subsidized rent is one of the main causes of the housing misery. No private owner puts part of his income or rent into renovation. And because the ownership of real estate does not yield anything but only costs money, many owners have given their houses to the state.

Nothing has changed with respect to the state of the real estate. Occasionally an action is proclaimed such as the event "Roofs Sealed by 1987" in the mid-1980's. Occasionally they order the checking of balconies. And then whole rows of them are cut off.

"Please take your laundry from the balcony," demanded construction workers from the tenants at 1 Arndtstrasse in Leipzig one Sunday morning in the mid-1970's. Then the men went to work with hammers and welding torches.

After the balconies were removed at that time, experts knocked a few holes in the house wall to check the condition of the building. The holes were not sealed up and thus water has been seeping into the brickwork for 15 years.

The decay of Arndtstrasse is now proceeding quickly. The house, built in 1913, once had very elegant 14-room apartments with a separate stairway for the domestic help. Nothing of the splendor of the early years is now visible: the plaster is falling from the ceiling of the staircase, the elevator with a lattice grate is covered with rust and the central heat has been out of operation since the end of the war.

The house, just as in almost all old buildings in the GDR, is heated with individual stoves. In the morning during the winter, when the citizens heat up their stoves, a pungent and caustic smell lies over Leipzig. For they use brown coal with a high sulfur content. The exhaust gases from the smokestacks in Leipzig mix with the sulfur vapors of the Espenhain brown-coal power plant and the scents of the Boehlen Petrochemical Combine, forming the smell of fog typical for the GDR.

There is no heating oil and gas is rationed. Only a few inhabitants, primarily handicapped people and families with many children, are allowed to heat with gas. Even in the total renovation of old buildings, called "reconstruction," individual stoves—generally with the standard beige tiles—are again brought into the rooms.

Of course central heating systems could be built for operation with coal. But such heating has the disadvantage that a stoker would have to resupply fuel on a regular basis. Stokers, a teaching profession in the GDR, are scarce; in addition, their wages would require even higher subsidies for housing.

"We would be happy to put in central heating but we are not allowed to," says Marbod Landsberg, production director with the VEB Modernization in Berlin. Landsberg and his 470 men are fighting against the decline of Prenzlauer Berg, the most run-down quarter in East Berlin.

A lack of materials repeatedly curbs the modernization work. Copper is not available, so they lay new electric lines out of aluminum. Steel and wood may not be used at all (or only with special permission). The construction workers replace deteriorated parquet floors and partially rotted floor boards with special gypsum plaster boards, provided that the factory in Rottleberode can supply enough of them; otherwise they must use particle board containing formaldehyde.

Landsberg has calculated that an average of 75,600 marks go into every apartment that he has reconstructed. That is approximately equal to the sum that an East Berliner pays in rent in eight decades.

An apartment in a new building, on the other hand, costs an average of only about 65,000 marks according to

official figures. And the apartments show it—they are stacked honeycombs put together out of standard slabs.

Settlements in the GDR have been assembled almost exclusively out of prefabricated concrete slabs since the beginning of the 1970's. There are 50 slab factories in the entire country, primarily with Soviet equipment, that produce their standardized concrete components in a three-shift operation.

The slabs are welded together on their iron reinforcements and the joints are then sealed with a thumb's breadth of plastic. Every multistory house in every settlement of new buildings is equipped with slabs of the same size. Compared with the monster-settlements such as Berlin-Marzahn (more than 170,000 inhabitants) or the "residential area Fritz Heckert" in Karl-Marx-Stadt (just under 100,000 inhabitants), the West German suburbs like Hamburg-Muennichsdamm or Cologne-Chorweiler seem downright cozy.

Houses can be built quickly and extremely inexpensively with the slabs; the heat insulation, however, is miserable. But just as everywhere else in the GDR, energy is wasted to an absurd extent in the apartments as well.

The costs for remote heat and hot water are included in the overall rent—less than two marks per square meter for new buildings. Since there is no incentive at all to save energy, the radiators were delivered to many settlements without shut-off valves; if someone does not like it as hot as it comes out of the pipe, he opens the windows. In other settlements such as the residential area Fritz Heckert in Karl-Marx-Stadt, the lines for remote heat were laid above ground.

Another disadvantage of this technique is much worse than the waste of energy in the slab structures. "When sloppy work is done in the formation of the joints," explains engineer Guenter Marchlowitz from the VEB Modernization in Berlin, "that leads to damage that can be corrected only at a tremendous expense."

The work has obviously been sloppy. Not only the cold but also water penetrates the plastic seals. The apartments are damp—the new buildings have already started to deteriorate.

While new cases for renovation develop in the high-rise settlements, the houses in the old-building areas are rotting faster than the modernization brigades can repair them. A restoration outlay of about 200 billion marks is needed to fix all apartments in the GDR, estimates the Hamburg construction expert Prof. Harald Juergensen.

The GDR cannot come up with the money for renovation by itself. The citizens of the GDR are registering with increasing anger that their housing situation will not improve for many years. "It is a shame how everything has gone to ruin here," says a tobacconist at Prenzlauer Berg with indignation. Ursula Roessler from Leipzig, who together with her husband has put 25,000

marks into an apartment in a now rotting house, feels that she has been "deceived by the authorities."

Many are now counting only on money and construction teams from the West. They no longer believe that the GDR can eliminate the housing misery on its own. "We," said the mechanic Saupe in his desolate environment, "are absolutely at our end."

Extreme Pollution in Bitterfeld Detailed

90EG0111A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
Vol 44 No 2, 8 Jan 90 pp 35-46

[Editorial report on Bitterfeld, "the filthiest city in Europe": "The People Are Getting Drunk"]

[Text] The district office has seen better days. The once red brick facades are black from soot from the power plant smokestacks and the adornments from the time of promoterism have been corroded by the caustic gases of the chemical industry.

Inside the building, the cleaning women have long since given up trying to scrub out of the synthetic floor the ash that officials bring in daily from the ever dirtier streets. The leaves are falling from the potted flowers in the corridor in front of the door of the environmental representative, where heavy marble columns still remind one of former splendor.

Rainer Frommann, 41, sits in a tiny office surrounded by five aquariums, in which perch and other small fish dart about. On his desk, the man, who for seven years has been in charge of "environmental protection, the water supply and recreation" in the council of Bitterfeld District, has a small facsimile of the three famous monkeys: see nothing, hear nothing, and say nothing.

Until four weeks ago, Frommann had always followed the advice of the wise monkeys. And even today one can still tell how difficult this work must have been: the environmental politician had always presented the dying trees, the reddish brown rivers and the no man's land plowed up by the strip mining of brown coal as "a near-urban landscape with its own experience zones." The Christian Democrat appears downright relieved that he is now able to speak of "a region of ecological catastrophe."

And the area around Bitterfeld is certainly that: whether it is the Fuhne, Leine, or Mulde—the only thing moving in the rivers is the industrial sludge; otherwise everything within kilometers is dead. The air is filthy, the underground water is poisoned and the soil is contaminated over broad areas. Absolutely unbelievable environmental damage is becoming apparent since supervisory officials and employees of the nationally owned combines began to reveal previously secret ecological data.

What kind of poison cocktail has actually been brewed in rivers and underground water—"no one here knows

that," says the Bitterfeld environmentalist Hans Zimmermann. No one can now say what kinds of dangerous old loads lie in the numerous "remaining holes" that the brown coal strip mining has left behind, in which the chemical industry has been dumping its wastes for almost 100 years.

When a foundation was recently dug on the grounds of the Bitterfeld Chemical Combine (CKB), with 18,000 employees the largest state enterprise in the region, the construction workers had to put on protective masks—so strongly did the ground water in the pit smell like dangerous solvents. When excavators tried to push together soil for a new road near the village of Heideloh to the west of Bitterfeld and thereby cut into an old industrial dump, poisonous vapors rose and reportedly one road worker toppled over immediately.

"We are sitting on a time bomb," says the chairman of the Bitterfeld District Council August Pietsch, 45. If help does not come soon, "from the government" (Pietsch) or from somewhere else, it will become "very critical for the health of our population." It has long been clear that the industrial community between Leipzig and Dessau is no clean-air resort: Hundreds of smokestacks continually belch fumes in this "dirtiest city in Europe," as the nest for 20,000 inhabitants was characterized in the novel "Flugasche" [Flue Ash] by the GDR author Monika Maron, who resettled in the West years ago. This is now being confirmed even by the district physician for sanitation: "One's hands can get dirty here doing nothing," says Juergen Schmidt, 61.

Film and paint factories, pesticide plants and aluminum works, soon a dozen coal-fired power plants and right before the front door an open strip mine six km long, from which, after the removal of the coal, amber is now being extracted with much resulting dust—the area is suffocating in ash, poison, and refuse.

The first miners were employed in strip mining as early as the middle of the last century. Entire villages have been wiped out since then. Streams and rivers lost their natural bed—almost half of the 454 square kilometers of Bitterfeld district have now been dug up.

The first chemical enterprise was established in 1893: Walther Rathenau, foreign minister of the Weimar Republic who was later assassinated but at that time was still junior director of the Allgemeinen Elektrizitaets-Gesellschaft (AEG) in Berlin, set up a chlorine production plant in Bitterfeld. Paint and film factories of the Aktiengesellschaft fuer Anilinfabrikation (Agfa) followed. The investors were attracted because, according to Adolf Eser, 53, general director of the CKB today, the basic materials for synthesis—"salt, water and coal"—were present in the once pretty landscape of pastures and meadows.

Meanwhile, a sea of industrial facilities and coal pits extends from the suburb Holzweissig in the south to the neighboring city of Wolfen in the north. The residential areas are like islands surrounded by waves: generally

houses, from which the plaster is crumbling, or housing silos with faded fronts. About 60,000 people live in the metropolitan area of Bitterfeld/Wolfen, often only a stone's throw away from the power plants and chlorine works.

The soot has blackened the roofs and a full pound of dust per square meter falls on some residential quarters every month. Rusty pipelines of the chemical industry that cover the region in all directions are continually emitting indefinable vapors. Gray clouds are constantly rising even from the gullies in the gloomy downtown part of Bitterfeld.

Gas masks (GDR term: "Fluchtfilter") hang in the reception of the inn of the chemical combine, just 100 meters away from a chlorine line. The "Strasse der Neuen Zeit" is in the lee of a chlorine electrolysis that is "only" 15 years old. The Polish guest workers living there do not have much future in the event of an emergency.

The fire sirens in the city wail every day, because somewhere a fire has broken out. "Three or four times a year," says the district sanitation physician, there is an "emergency alarm": one time it may be a leaking chlorine line and another time an entire city section is flooded with phosphates.

Nevertheless, there have hardly been any audible protests up to now. In November, opposition groups were able to mobilize just a few thousand people for the demonstrations in front of the old town hall, where bullet holes remain a reminder of the revolt of the workers after the Kapp insurrection in 1920. The clan died away quickly.

"The people are too comfortable," says the protestant pastor Matthias Spenn, "they earn too much." The disaster is simply accepted for monthly salaries of 2,000 to 3,000 marks.

"Why should I complain?" asks the old lady, who lives in a "two-room dwelling" with a kitchen in the "Strasse der Chemiewerker" for 20.70 marks a month rent. Every Saturday she sweeps up a bucketful of soot in front of her door directly across from the South Power Plant that belongs to the chemical combine. That is progress: years ago, after all, the old lady had to sweep up six buckets of soot every week.

The tiny house of Bodo Berger, 38, in the locality of Wachtendorf is also clean. The master mechanic received the "golden house number" for this. A few hundred meters away, the Johannes Pit, colloquially known as "Silbersee" [silver lake] because the photo-chemical combine in Wolfen allows its toxic wastes from the pulp and film production (brand name: "Orwo") to gush into it, emits toxic fumes.

What grows in Berger's garden is only conditionally edible. Every year he receives 400 marks in garden money from the chemical combine so that he can buy

fruit in the store. The worker is sometimes aroused from his sleep by a caustic stench. "Then," says Berger, "the chemical combine has again released something." It may be that he will find the next day that the roses in his front yard have perished one again.

According to the previously secret files of the environmentalist Frommann, the smokestacks in the Bitterfeld area are now blowing almost 40,000 tons of dust and 90,000 tons of sulfur dioxide into the air every year—almost three times as much as in the West German Land of Hesse, which is 46 times as large; besides that, they emit 13,000 tons of nitrous oxides and an equal amount of carbon monoxide.

Toxic chlorine gases, caustic hydrochloric acid (a total of 1,800 tons), the potential war gas hydrofluoric acid (700 tons), which can produce skeletal deformations), and about 15,000 tons of dangerous solvents complete the aerial brew. The filth comes mainly from a few large enterprises.

The CKB alone—a chemical general merchandise store that produces about 4,500 "final products" (GDR jargon) ranging from a total herbicide to artificial gems—blows 40,000 tons of sulfur dioxide into the air. The remaining sulfur dioxide comes mainly from the Karl Liebknecht Brown Coal Combine that maintains an antiquated 80-year-old briquette factory with attached power plant, from the three power plants of the Orwo Combine or from the Muldenstein Railroad Power Plant (built 1915), which loses 120 East German marks for every megawatt-hour produced but spreads 16,000 tons of flue ash over the countryside every year by itself.

Even at the time when information was blocked, it was impossible to keep completely secret the fact that the caustic exhaust gases are not without effect. Horror stories are circulating about garden dwarfs whose noses have fallen off and about cooking utensils which, accidentally left outside in the fall, crumble in one's hand in the spring. And many a pastor in the region has had to order new church windows because the lead glazing had simply disintegrated in the caustic air.

A plaque in the district museum reports that the trees in Bitterfeld "get brown leaves as early as June"—fall begins in the summer.

Many plants no longer experience spring. The trees along Bitterfeld's arterial roads are dying out. In Duebener Heide, a "nearby recreation area" 20 km to the east of Bitterfeld that lies in the field of fire of the filth-thrower Muldenstein, foresters must write off 1,000 cubic feet of oak wood annually on every hectare of forest floor and 600 cubic meters each of pine and spruce trunks.

On the "Hermann Falke Footpath" between Bitterfeld and Wolfen, named after an early communist, nature has given up completely. Here, however, the deadly poison came from underneath.

Like monuments to capital crimes against the environment, the dead trunks along the path, which the district administration still calls a "path for learning about nature," tower 10-20 meters into the hazy sky. A torrent rushes through the nirvana, the waste brew from the photo combine in Wolfen. And the silver lake glistens reddish brown.

After a waiting time in the cesspool, the dirty flood from Orwo flows toward the stream Fuhne that then changes its name to Spittelwasser. With the sewage "original Wolfen" just from two decrepit cellulose plants of the photo combine, 300 kg of carbolic acid, which can produce kidney and liver damage in humans, 200 tons of salts and 180 tons of lignins—stinking wastes from the production of cellulose—rush downstream every day in the direction of the Elbe.

To the east of Wolfen, the brew from Orwo mixes with a huge load of filth that, coming from the Bitterfeld Chemical Combine, gushes down the valley of the Mulde. A poison cocktail is now concocted that not even the VEB [state enterprise] chemists are able to analyze.

Every year the CKB drains off more than 70 million cubic meters of sewage, enough for a train of tank cars extending from Hamburg to Melbourne, from its reaction ovens and stirring machines. Most of it runs to the Spittelwasser and a smaller part flows into the Mulde. The sewage contains, among other things, 176,000 tons of salts, 250 tons of carbolic acid and 1,200 tons of directly toxic substances.

Also swimming in the poisonous brew every year are 42 tons of pure sulfuric acid, eight tons of mercury, several thousand tons of the dangerous chlorinated carbohydrates and huge quantities of aromatic carbon compounds—mercaptans, for example. The combine with its 80 individual enterprises does not have a proper sewage treatment plant.

Because their dirty loads exceed all limiting values, the two combines send more than 20 million East German marks annually to the district superintendency in Halle as a lump-sum compensation. The controllers of the water authority there are not at all in a position to examine the poisonous flood—not just because of a lack of measuring techniques but also because of inadequate transportation.

For the 15 officials, who are supposed to oversee the 531 km of river in the Halle District measuring 8,771 km², have just two official cars at their disposal and 400 liters of gasoline per month.

Not even Karl Enders, 49, environmental representative from the CKB, knows what kind of devilry the toxins from the Wolfen-Bitterfeld filth add up to. The "measuring slave" (Enders on Enders) can only analyze the conventional substances in the sewage but not the chlorine compounds, for example. So when asked whether dangerous dioxins could be included, he merely shrugs helplessly: "How should I know?"

The slimy brew stinks infernally. In the small town of Raguhn, for example, which lies 5 km downstream from Wolfen, it would more frequently be appropriate to put a gas mask over one's nose, because the fumes rising from the Mulde and Spittelwasser waft around the entire town and even penetrate the living rooms. At a citizens' meeting in the clubhouse on the bank of the Mulde, Enders tries clumsily to speak out about an "unpleasant annoying smell"—in any case, he says, the substance is not "acutely toxic."

But before that he himself had climbed out of his Wartburg in shock. If one peers into the brew for a time, tears will come to his eyes and his tongue will become strangely dry.

"We have just one life and we would like to have something from it," says the chemist Guenter Krieg at the meeting. But Bodo Schulze, 38, a manager from the photo combine in Wolfen, reassures the people, saying that there is "no acute danger" to life even at the silver lake. The warning signs put up there that had awakened the mistrust of the citizens are—how reassuring—"there only for architectural reasons."

That is probably also how it is with the other remaining holes and pits that have signs that say "Careful, Mortal Danger." The uncontrolled garbage dumps and waste depots are scattered in the landscape around Bitterfeld like pimples in a pockmarked face—each perhaps more dangerous than the other.

At the Antonie Pit not far from the "road of the thousand scents," so called because of the various leaks in the chemical combine, for example, there are about 50,000 tons of highly dangerous chlorine wastes. And no one really knows what is in the toxic waste dump "Freiheit III" on the road to Halle.

Since the 1960's, the trucks from the CKB, in which the ultrapoisonous E 605 is still being produced, have been heaping some 120,000 tons of chemical wastes, primarily poisonous, on the dump every year. The substances often react with each other and ignite—it is "sizzling and smoldering" at the dump, reports environmentalist Zimmermann. The pit has no seal on the bottom. Only part of the seeping water is caught and the rest flows untreated to the small river Leine.

At the garden colony "Vergissmeinnicht" there on the Leine, CKB General Director Eser also has a small plot of land. He eats the fruits and vegetables that grow there without worry "as long as nothing is detectable over the taste threshold." But Eser once left a glass of green beans alone, saying that they were somehow "suspicious."

Eser in his dark pin-striped suit sits in his rather large office: the general director, who is chief of a chemical empire with external branches from Bernberg to Karl-Marx-Stadt, earns 3,500 marks gross income monthly. "We have not made a Garden of Eden out of Bitterfeld," says Eser thoughtfully. But he knows times "when it was worse."

A painting hanging behind his back depicts, quite colorfully, the rusty towers in which the nitric acid is produced on the CKB grounds. Built in 1917, the facility is still in operation.

The two aluminum smelting works in the CKB are likewise no longer as fresh as daisies. One of them was closed down at the beginning of December because of, among other things, the danger of collapse. In the other enterprise, they are now installing a suction plant, which, according to a CKB employee, will also hardly improve the working conditions there. Oppressive heat prevails in the hall and gray dust obscures everything. Flat steel cauldrons, each as large as a grave, have been installed side by side in long rows. A silvery liquid, aluminum, cooks in them, heated by a coal fire, the flames of which continually flare up.

The workers who busy themselves with crowbars around the cauldrons inhale toxic fluorine gases. The substance can accumulate in their bones and even lead to paralysis—an occupational disease called fluorosis that is quite common in Bitterfeld.

It is not just the "alu-hut," as the works is called among the workers, that makes people sick at the CKB. Whether in the production of polyvinyl chloride or pharmaceuticals, in the two old chlorine-electrolysis plants or in the production of ion exchangers (brand name: "Wofatit")—"41 percent of the working people" at the CKB are, as the general director recently revealed, unduly stressed in their health. And that is generally because of the "dilapidated facilities" (Frommann).

After the war, here as elsewhere in the GDR, the SED started up the machines from the time of the Nazis and empire—to the extent that they had not been dismantled—so that they could continue to produce, this time under the flag of socialism.

And so the chemical plants in Bitterfeld and Wolfen that had been taken over by the IG-Farben empire in the 1920's were divided into two combines. Instead of reorganization and renewal, they were only patched and repaired and every effort was made to get as much as possible out of the existing machinery. Now, however, says CKB subgroup director Horst Wilhelm bitterly, "we stand on a heap of ruins."

Six of 80 enterprises in the Bitterfeld CKB have been given the approval to work as exceptions, because it is also the view of the SED that they have been producing in a way that is so harmful to health that a permanent approval is no longer granted. At another 10 production sites, they continue to accept the exceeding of the maximum allowable amount of harmful substances at the workplace (MAK-value). According to the statistics of factory hygiene, about 4,300 people are working in the chemical combine under such bad conditions that they "can expect their health to be impaired."

So it happens sometimes that, as last September, an 18-year-old sports student in good physical condition

had to be taken to the hospital in an ambulance on suspicion of jaundice after having worked only a few days in the CKB plant "P5," where they handle chlorobenzene. And the plant physician is not even surprised by this: "Accident at P5?" There is certainly nothing unusual about that.

Of the approximately 50 employees of a CKB research center in Wolfen, where new plant protection agents are developed, five people—from a gardener to chemists—died in the last four years, according to official figures. "They all had cancer," reports a Bitterfeld physician.

A remarkable psychological illness is rampant in a part of the Orwo Combine, where viscose fibers were spun until the end of December. Carbon bisulfide that had leaked from the rotten machines in such high concentrations that the MAK-value was exceeded by a factor of 90, according to the official documents, acts as a neurological toxin in the brain and causes irreparable damage: "The people get drunk, aggressive or apathetic," says a physician.

What the plants conduct to the outside through smokestacks and sewage pipes also makes animals and humans sick. A CKB employee reported that dead beavers in the valley of the Mulde showed skeletal changes. The agricultural production cooperatives in the region have problems in getting their cows to become gravid and the fattened cattle just will not get fat—a "performance depression with environmental causes," says an expert.

The children in Bitterfeld get sick with bronchitis and other respiratory ailments two to three times mores frequently than the new generation elsewhere in the GDR. An internal long-term study shows that their bone growth is two to eight months behind that of their contemporaries from other regions.

A comparison with children near the Baltic Sea, reports the district physician for sanitation Schmidt, also revealed "significant deviations in the immune system" of Bitterfeld school children eight to 10 years of age. Because the investigation likewise showed that these disorders are "reparable, thank God" (Schmidt), the physician had demanded in vain as early as last January that the children must be taught in a village boarding school somewhere near the sea for four weeks during the year. At last Schmidt is now hoping for success.

Under the planning of the sanitation agency, a cancer ward is also now supposed to be established at the Bitterfeld District Hospital. Schmidt wants to find out "through the death certificates" whether it is true what a study in the West indicates: that in Bitterfeld men die five years sooner and women eight years sooner than elsewhere.

The environmental representative Enders, who has long been bothered by the ecological disaster—and this is obvious—has gathered fresh hope that the broken-down works can be thoroughly reorganized with the help of

Western investors. "The West," Enders fears, "would probably shut down 70 percent here." But nothing can be done without the West.

Take "the stretch of water that we can only control when we have something going for us through agreements with the FRG," says the environmental representative. Yes, in his view, "Hoechst or Bayer" could "crack" the dirty load. After all, the Western aid would yield "something for the FRG as well." Enders: "Everything that we release here ends up in the North Sea."

But Enders considers less useful what Lower Saxony's Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht is willing to spend for the CKB. In accordance with an agreement with the GDR Ministry for Environmental Protection, the mercury is supposed to be recovered from the sewage of the ancient chlorine plants of the CKB for DM 50 million. "That," says the environmental representative, "is as though I hang a golden clock behind two corpses."

The photo combine is also unable to proceed on its own strength. "We are not expecting any handouts," says manager Schulze, vice director for production with Orwo, "but we urgently need Western help."

Supposedly there have been plans since 1975 to reorganize the two cellulose plants that were built in the 1930's but the project was always rejected. But now something like that ought to be possible, Schulze hopes: "The West also profits from this." If the two plants were torn down and rebuilt, the Elbe would be cleaner "at one blow" (Schulze).

Many of the production areas in the cellulose works seem like stalagmite caverns: the ceiling plaster is hanging loose and the antiquated cauldrons are so leaky that people must get the feeling that they would suffocate. The air is so caustic that it seems as though pure sulfur dioxide is leaking out of the machines and nevertheless men without masks stand there working.

Right next to the cellulose works is the viscose plant that was built in 1936 for Hitler's "imperial fiber program." Until shortly before Christmas, about 500 workers there had spun 40 percent of the GDR's requirement for artificial silk—about 25,000 tons annually for stockings, underwear, and knitted goods.

The plant in December: garden hoses lie on the ground floor of the dilapidated building where the viscose is liquified in rotten tanks; the floor tiles must be kept moist constantly to bind the hydrogen sulfide that leaks incessantly from the worn-out valves.

On the middle floor, the cellulose rotates in antediluvian drums. On the upper floor, where—first station in the viscose production process—the cellulose is dissolved in soda lye, stands the worker Renate Loebel, 57, in an antiquated-looking measuring station that at least was built in the 1970's. "I am still quite well even after 39 years here," she says, but many are hit by the neurological poison "after just 8 days."

She points to the older colleague sitting apathetically in the corner: "Achim is also sick from sulfur." Then the worker raises her pant leg—her skin is yellowish brown to the calves and the wounds do not heal.

The worker takes six circulation tablets every day, "otherwise I cannot do anything." But neither can she go along with the fact that now the plant is finally to be torn down because of the "immediate danger to health" (Schulze). All of a sudden the old worker snaps at the young manager Schulze: "If you all had just not worked so sloppily."

HUNGARY

1987-89 Foreign Trade Performance Analyzed

25000560 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
14 Dec 89 p 8

[Article by Miklos Losoncz: "External Economy Performance 1987-89: It Could Have Been Better!"; first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] Among the moving forces of economic growth, along with technological development, the role of the international division of labor has appreciated universally and in the long term, beginning in the early 1970's. For this reason, the development of the Hungarian economy, and the accomplishments of economic policy during the period of almost three years are reflected in a concentrated form by external economic performance indicators. The author draws the conclusion that the picture we see is not too flattering.

The forint value of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars expanded by 15 percent in 1987, 30 percent in 1988, and 29 percent during the first nine months of 1989, as compared to identical periods in the previous years. Compared to 1986, when exports declined by eight percent, the period we are analyzing may be regarded as favorable. Export performance can be seen better, however, when analyzed in terms of convertible foreign exchange. The dollar value of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars increased by 12 percent in 1987, 16 percent in 1988, and eight percent in 1989. This pace of growth is substantially slower than the expansion measured in forint value.

Dynamics

The growth of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars (and expressed in dollars) represented 70 percent of global export dynamics in 1987, and 125 percent in 1988. In other words, in 1987 Hungary's losing trend in the global economy continued, and the 1988 performance did not suffice to compensate for the the previous year's relative deterioration in the trading position. (Within the markets of developed capitalist countries which present the most stringent competitive conditions, in the OECD relationship Hungary's export

expansion amounted to 131.6 percent of OECD imports in 1987, but the same amounted to only 84.4 percent in 1988.)

The qualitative and structural components of external economic performance are characterized by the fact that the price index of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars increased by nine percent in 1987, 15 percent in 1988, and 20 percent in 1989 if counted in forints, while the same percentages are seven, seven, and 0.4 respectively, when counted in dollars.

In the aggregate, Hungarian export price changes reflected 102 percent of world trade price increases in 1987, while in 1988 the same percentage was 92. Hungarian food exports subject to settlement in dollars did not keep in step with international price trends in 1988. Machinery and equipment export price increases amounted to only 94 percent of the global average increase, while in 1988 it was only 91 percent. Accordingly, in 1988 the relative price parity of both food products consisting mostly of bulk commodities traded on exchanges, and of technologically up-to-date machinery and equipment has expanded.

Calculated in dollars, the volume of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars expanded by 4.7 percent in 1987, 8.8 percent in 1988, and 7.3 percent in 1989.

Balance

The ratio between Hungarian imports subject to settlement in dollars and offsetting Hungarian exports has increased from the 1986 level of 90 percent to 94 percent in 1987, and 110 percent in 1988. But the fact that the improving trend ran out of steam may be seen during the first eight months of 1989 when this ratio dropped to 104 percent.

The improvement in the external economic balance is also relative, if compared on an international scale. As compared to 1986, in 1987 the total combined average import offsetting ratio in countries that do not produce crude oil increased to a greater extent than in Hungary: from 91 percent to 99 percent. But in Colombia the increase was from 97 percent to 114 percent, in Turkey from 64 percent to 72 percent, in India from 62 percent to 69 percent, in China from 68 percent to 89 percent, in Tunisia from 59 percent to 73 percent, and in Morocco from 62 percent to 71 percent. The import offsetting ratio also increased in 1988 as compared to 1987 at a higher rate than in Hungary, e.g. in Brazil from 170 percent to 237 percent, in Ecuador from 97 percent to 126 percent, and in Uruguay from 102 percent to 120 percent.

The Hungarian foreign trade deficit accountable in dollars declined from a \$470 million level in 1986 to \$320 million in 1987, followed by an almost \$500 million trade surplus in 1988. During the first 10 months of 1989 a surplus of \$280 million was accumulated.

The balance evolved as a function of the world market business cycle, of free foreign exchange trade with socialist countries, and, in the case of China, as a function of clearing trade. The improvement of 1987 can be credited to a large extent to deficit reduction vis-a-vis developed capitalist countries. The 1988 surplus may be credited primarily to the improving trade balance with developed capitalist countries. One cannot disregard, however, the significantly improved balance in trade payable in free foreign exchange with socialist countries, and in clearing trade with China subject to settlement in convertible currencies.

The 1987, 1988, and 1989 increase in Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars may be credited to material and energy intensive foundry products, mass produced metal products, building materials, labor intensive light industry consumer goods, some material intensive chemicals (synthetics, synthetic fibers, rubber products), and to certain food industry products, all of which have declined as a result of international structural transformation processes. The role of technological development, and of the expert labor intensive machine and fine chemical branches and subbranches in this process is minimal.

Transformation of the structure is characterized by the fact that in Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars, the ratio of foundry products increased from 10.1 percent in 1986, and 10 percent in 1987 to 11.9 percent in 1988, while the same percentages in the building industry are 3.5, 3.6, and 3.3 percent; in chemicals 15.1, 16.0, and 16.6 percent; and in light industry products 13.2, 14.6, and again 13.2 percent. Together, the weight of mass produced metal products and machine industry products has declined from the 13.1 percent level in 1986 to 11.6 percent in 1987, but then again increased to 22.3 percent in 1988. Pharmaceuticals, regarded as a lead industry, declined from a 3.8 percent share in both 1986 and 1987 to 3.2 percent in 1988. On the other hand, agricultural product exports subject to settlement in dollars represented 11.8 percent of such exports in 1986, 10.2 percent in 1987, and 10.6 percent in 1988. The share of food products in the framework of such exports was 17.3, 17.2, and 17.1 percent. These trends were even more pronounced in 1989.

The manner in which the structure of trade relations has changed may be regarded as more favorable. Based on the direction and extent of change, the fact that of all Hungarian exports the share of OECD countries has increased from 36 percent in 1986, to 44 percent in 1988 and 42 percent in 1989 is favorable. Consistent with global economic trends, as part of all Hungarian exports, sales to the United States increased from 2.4 percent in 1986 to three percent in 1987, and 2.9 percent in 1988; the same figures relative to Japan are 0.5, 0.6, and 0.9 percent. In 1986, 11.7 percent of Hungarian exports were destined for the United Kingdom, Finland, Turkey, and the FRG (extremely significant from the Hungarian standpoint), all of which developed faster than the

regional average. In 1988 15.4 percent of Hungarian exports were directed to these countries. On the other hand, it is an unfavorable phenomenon that in the context of Hungarian exports the marginal ratio of rapidly industrializing Latin American and Far Eastern countries has continued to remain unchanged both in 1987 and in 1988.

Although between 1986 and 1989 the ratio in Hungarian trade of regions, subregions, and countries subject to dynamic development has increased, in 1988 68 percent of Hungarian exports were still directed to West and East European countries which develop at a rate slower than the global average.

At current prices, counted in rubles, exports subject to settlement in rubles increased by 1.6 percent in 1987, and by 1.1 percent in 1988 and in the first eight months of 1989. Imports increased by 2.2 percent in 1987 and 0.3 percent in 1988, and declined by 8.4 percent during the first eight months of 1989. Regarding the Hungarian surplus derived from trade subject to settlement in rubles, the 100 million ruble surplus of 1986 changed to 50 million rubles in 1987, then increased to about 220 million rubles in 1988 and to about 400 million rubles during the first eight months of 1989.

Further Loss of Territory

Between 1987 and 1989 Hungary's exports subject to settlement in dollars expanded primarily in quantitative terms. The growth was boosted mostly independent of Hungarian economic policy, as a result of positive global economic effects, and by favorable demand for and increased prices of traditional Hungarian industrial products as well as agricultural products. The latter was related to unfavorable weather conditions, and all of this occurred in Hungary's traditional markets abroad. The Hungarian economy as a whole did not take advantage of this boom between 1987 and 1989 either, neither in terms of export volume, nor with regard to prices. The dynamics of exports subject to settlement in dollars fell behind global exports, and although to a smaller extent than before, Hungary's loss of territory in the global economy continued. Discontinuation of favorable external conditions exerts disadvantageous effects on the dynamics of Hungarian exports subject to settlement in dollars, which largely depends of global economic cycles (as has been suggested in part by 1989 data thus far).

Several countries struggling with difficulties similar to Hungary's improved their trade balances more forcefully, increased their offsetting import ratios, and took advantage of the favorable global economic boom. On top of this, certain onetime factors which cannot be repeated regularly because of the asymmetry of bargaining power—e.g., the improved balance in socialist trade and in clearing trade with China, both subject to settlement in free foreign exchange—played a significant role in the improvement of the Hungarian trade balance.

Only small changes occurred during 1987, 1988, and 1989 in the merchandise structure of exports subject to

settlement in dollars. The direction of change is also unfavorable: It does not follow international trends. The change in the merchandise structure was highlighted by the advancement of products which declined in international structural transformation processes and which clashed with the competitive supply of developing countries and the protectionist measures of developed capitalist countries, by the stagnation of natural resource intensive agricultural products, and by the decline of products which required technological development. The increase in exports was fostered by the advancement of traditionally declining branches: Performance improved in the branches which fall behind. The structure of exports was different from the international trends; both the extent and the direction of changes may be regarded as unfavorable.

Aware of the level of preparedness one finds in partner countries, the increase in surplus subject to settlement in rubles holds great dangers.

Insofar as global economic conditions are concerned, 1987, 1988, and 1989 were the most favorable years in this century. Yet the total combined external economic performance of Hungary did not keep in step with the performance of other countries, the opportunities arising in the external markets would have enabled better performance both in terms of quantity and quality, as well as a greater improvement of the balance. On the other hand, additional foreign exchange revenues derived from favorable global market demand and price formulations—largely independent of Hungarian economic policy—did not serve to reduce our debt burden and did not serve the technical and structural modernization of the economy because of mistaken economic policy decisions, (such as the foreign exchange supply provided to individuals relative to the introduction of the global passport, and the regulation of foreign exchange management).

Banks Take Financial Restructuring Route in Bankruptcy Proceedings

25000577A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
21 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by G. Zs.: "Bankruptcy Proceedings Initiated; Enterprises Owe 200 Billion Forints"]

[Text] There is no list of any kind concerning enterprises going bankrupt. This is true, if for no other reason, because insolvency does not necessarily mean that an enterprise is unable to compete, or that it is unable to function on the marketplace, according to Miklos Pulai, Hungarian Banking Association executive secretary, at the Association's press conference yesterday. Pulai then went on to report the conditions under which banks promised the government that they would initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Probably the most important of these gives some incentive to banks to initiate bankruptcy proceedings: Banks may transfer housing funds to their risk funds in proportion to losses incurred.

Several commercial banking officials reported on the number of enterprises against which they had initiated bankruptcy proceedings. They stressed that the initiation of such proceedings does not mean the closure of factories, but that the banks force these enterprises to adopt programs which may result in their recovery from bankruptcy conditions, as a result of transforming their production structures or by some other means. There are hopeless cases, of course, including instances when the indebtedness of an enterprise exceeds its total value.

Sandor Demjan, chairman and president of the Hungarian Credit Bank, said that the unpaid bills total 200 billion forints. This is the amount owed by enterprises to the state, to the tax authorities, to banks, and to each other. Demjan felt that the best solution would be to permit other enterprises and private entrepreneurs to purchase enterprises permanently declared to be bankrupt, on the basis of open competitive bidding. Such purchases should be supported by loans provided by the state. Foreigners will buy these enterprises if such credit cannot be obtained, and they will put the bankrupt enterprises in order.

In analyzing the reasons for the 200 billion forint indebtedness, Demjan was critical of the government's excessive tight money policies which lead to "standing in line": Enterprises are providing credit to each other, excluding banks from the transaction of creating money, and thus no real values are created. Demjan regarded the Hungarian National Bank's [MNB] relaxation of the foreign exchange monopoly as encouraging: Commercial banks managing foreign exchange accounts shorten the time element involved between exportation and receipt of payment. As a result of delays, some \$2.5 billion are tied up unnecessarily, according to Demjan. Regarding the economy as a whole, Demjan said that by now the country is unable to help itself; whether the Hungarian economy collapses, and if so, when, is a matter of external intentions only.

Large Agricultural Co-op Workers Polled on Land Ownership Issues

90EC0219A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 22 Dec 89 p 19

[Article by Sandor Gali: "Land Ownership: Who Should Own It?"]

[Text] One of the oldest and largest agricultural cooperatives in the country is the Red Star Cooperative at Fuzesgyarmat. Its land area exceeds 13,000 hectares, and it has 1,779 members, of whom 528 are retired. But the cooperative provides a livelihood to many more people, because it also has employees and contractual workers. It is a real, modern, large plant. Plant growing is mechanized, it has several plants for oxen and a significant number of hogs, and it ranks second in poultry production, immediately following the Babolna Agricultural Combine. (The cooperative produces 10 million chickens and 35,000 fatted pigs each year.)

How does the membership of the Red Star cooperative relate to the ongoing political and economic changes in Hungary? To find out, the leaders of the cooperative addressed the following letter to the membership:

"Dear Member!

"New laws provide an option for the membership to increase the area used for household farming, and for the distribution of the cooperative's net assets among members. Some of the new political parties are demanding that cooperatives be dissolved and that the land be sold. We would like to know the members' views with regard to these issues. For this reason we request that you respond to the following six questions with a 'yes' or 'no' answer, and that you return the questionnaire unsigned via the leader at your workplace.

"14 September 1989

"The leadership of the cooperative."

Hired Laborers

Somewhat simplified, (i.e. not in their original rendition) the six questions were as follows:

- (1) Would you like to have the cooperative dissolved, and private ownership of land restored?
- (2) Would you support a division into independent units, with independent financial and legal responsibility?
- (3) Would you support the establishment of a stock corporate form, and the distribution of income on the basis of shares held?
- (4) Should the size of household farm land be increased so that in areas exceeding 6,000 square meters the cooperative would perform machine work, while members of the cooperative would perform manual work?
- (5) Should it be possible to sell the cooperative's land to members, or even to outsiders?
- (6) Other views, comments...

A total of 1,073 workers, 740 active and 333 retired, responded to the questions. Here are the responses in the order of the questions:

Yes	No
29	1,044
342	731
213	853
196	872
242	817

As the table indicates, 60.3 percent of the cooperative's members responded. One could argue of course whether that is a lot, or if it is too little. On the one hand, it is too few because the cooperative's leadership was unable to learn the views of 40 percent of its members, even though they certainly hold opinions. Why did they not

express those views? Were they scared of something, or did they feel that their view did not count anyway? On the other hand, 60 percent amounts to a lot if we consider that the membership's linkage has essentially disappeared; that the status of cooperative membership in large agricultural plants has sunk to that of hired laborers; that an aptitude to deal with public affairs had been eradicated from the membership as a result of methods of direction, because during the past 15 years the views of the membership have been sought with decreasing frequency; and that the desire for individual enrichment, which Istvan Szechenyi felt was "not so much a lowly desire," has been revived.

The first question was rather provocative. The response to it is convincing. Even if all of those who did not respond had responded with a 'yes' vote, well over half of the cooperative's membership would have voted in favor of continuing the cooperative.

Cooperative members were able to respond to the second question on the basis of their own specific experiences, because during its entire existence the cooperative has always endeavored to broaden the tight framework provided by law. The initial shared cultivation, the expansion of household farming, was followed by the recognition of joint work. Later some ventures were started, the members' funds were drawn in to develop the common farm, and the establishment of semi-independent units became characteristic.

Risk Is the Key Issue

In this relation Dr. Arpad Nagy, deputy president of the cooperative (taking a vote by way of a questionnaire was his idea), had this to say: "The key issue in regard to any venture is the degree of risk one has to take. People have voted to have a venture in which risks are borne by the cooperative, while profits belong to the members."

The reason for this may be that a real entrepreneurial spirit has been extinguished in people over the past 40 years. One must nevertheless be engaged in enterprise, and the degree of independence may also be signalled by the sign which expresses ownership, something like this: "Cooperative Machine Repair Works; Istvan Nagy and Associates, owners; Quick, Punctual, Low Cost Service."

Dr. Arpad Nagy is probably correct. This may be the path of the future. And at this time the cooperative members are scared; they dare not take risks.

The third question raised an interesting point. To whom does the cooperative belong? Does it belong to those who established the cooperative and contributed their own small properties? Or to those who just worked there for 20, 30, or 40 years? Could it be possible that part of the cooperative property belongs to the state, because it supported the cooperative for many long decades? Doubtless, the founders made the greatest sacrifice because they contributed all they had to the cooperative. They would be the real owners. But by now, where are those first ones, the pioneers? Well then, should the share

of the property belong to the heirs? But by now this is no longer the property of the founders, its value has been multiplied by cooperative workers, by investments realized with the help of state subsidies. Those involved in this matter confront a complex issue. Arpad Nagy believes that the personification of cooperative property must begin. "And this cannot be started with the heirs of the former owners; that would not be fair. Working cooperative members are the real owners. The cooperative belongs to them, and it must be distributed among them in such a manner that this share of the property functions like actual property."

The answers received to the fourth question make one ponder the most. According to the practice followed at present in Fuzesgyarmat with regard to household farming areas, a unit is defined as 6,000 square meters. A cooperative member himself cultivates this land, or, if he does not want to do so, the cooperative will provide him 25 quintals of corn or wheat. On the other hand, a member who believes that he can produce more value than that will cultivate the land himself, but may use the services provided by the cooperative in lieu of payment. True, it is hardly conceivable that every cooperative member receives 25 quintals of produce for each individual household farming unit. Increasing the size of household farms would be conceivable only if investment costs are reimbursed to the cooperative, and the profits that remain over and above those costs are left with the cooperative members. Nevertheless, a majority of the respondents reject this alternative. One wonders why. Could they be concerned that the venture will fail? Or is it only the fact that they do not want to take the risk? Could it be that the household farm consumes too much of their time already?

At Fuzesgyarmat in the early 1980's labor intensive household farming areas comprised several hundred hectares: Poppies were grown on 100-120 hectares, and onions on 60-70 hectares. And when they started the household farm chicken program in 1982, when several hundred thousand forints worth of chicken pens were built and paid for by the cooperative members, the area used for labor intensive household farming decreased. At present Red Star Cooperative has integrated 300 partners raising chicken, and this represents the largest entrepreneurial group. There are concerns that these partners will also step back, because of increasing costs and stagnating buying up prices, which produce losses.

Land Prices

Asked if the cooperative should sell land, 77.1 percent of the respondents answered in the negative. Why this rejection? The reason is that in today's Hungary land has no price. And the members are concerned that the cooperative leadership will waste the land, the most important asset. Surely, one would not have to be concerned about selling land, if land had a decent price.

One frequently hears that land managed by cooperatives has been abused and neglected. At Fuzesgyarmat, sodic

soil was made into arable land by using (unjustly forgotten) one of the best and most efficient methods. Complex melioration was accomplished on more than 200,000 hectares; they are able to irrigate virtually the entire area; and each year some 4,000 or 5,000 railroad cars of natural manure are spread on these lands. It is equally true that the superiority of large enterprises in plant cultivation is beyond debate, while in regard to animal breeding smaller units are more cost efficient.

Accordingly, the land should have a price, it should be saleable, and wherever small plants work better, anyone should be able to buy land. But one must not forcefully extort the sale of land; only the opportunity for selling the land must be established. According to some calculations, at the time producer cooperatives were established the country suffered a loss in the order of a hundred billion forints when technology acquired from small plants became superfluous in large plants. We must not want to choose this path also on our return voyage, because the resultant loss would be far greater and the population's food supplies would be endangered. If it

were true that small peasant estates produce in a more economic fashion, Poland would not be suffering from food shortages. On the other hand, the Soviet example serves as a caution that large agricultural plant management in itself does not provide assurances for increasing the average yield of harvests, and for securing needed food supplies.

POLAND

Agricultural Assistance From Denmark

26000011 Copenhagen *BERLINGSKE TIDENDE* in Danish 10 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] A Danish-Polish seminar next month will be the kickoff for more solid cooperation in the area of agriculture between Denmark and Poland, writes the newspaper *VESTKYSTEN*. The goal is to undertake a concrete joint project in the daily sector, from which both countries could derive a benefit.

HUNGARY

Religious Authorities on Ecumenicism, Pluralism, Political Role

Roman Catholic View

25000581 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
23 Dec 89 p 18

[Interview with Tamas Nyiri, professor at the Roman Catholic Theological Academy, by Laszlo Hovanyecz: "We Want To Turn Our Enemies Into Friends"; date and place not given]

[Text] [NEPSZABADSAG] For quite some time now, much has been said in Hungary about cooperation among the churches concerning various issues pertaining to ecumenicism. According to my experience, however, many people are unclear concerning the concept of ecumenicism, and know little about the history of the ecumenical movement.

[Nyiri] The best Hungarian term for ecumenicism would be "an endeavor to achieve unity." In other words, it is an endeavor manifested by various Christian churches torn away from each other to restore unity in some way. Along with several smaller schisms, we have recorded two large schisms between churches.

The first took place in the year 1054, when Western and Eastern Christianity separated. At that time the Pope of Rome and the Byzantine Patriarch mutually excommunicated each other. The other, perhaps more grave schism or separation occurred at the time of the Reformation. An endeavor for unity, which we call ecumenicism does not simply strive for cooperation among the various churches, but also seeks to unify these churches.

Previously the Catholic Church delimited itself from ecumenical endeavors, or it was able to perceive unity only if the religions and religious communities torn away would return to the Catholic fold. Incidentally, the origins of the ecumenical movement date back to the turn of the century.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Who initiated that?

[Nyiri] Protestant preachers and missionaries who recognized that it would be impossible to represent Christianity in any credible manner as long as it remained divided to this extent. The World Council of Churches came about in Amsterdam in 1948 as a result of an about half a century long development. This is what we call it; in other languages they call it the Ecumenical Council of Churches.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Only the protestant churches also took part in this movement?

[Nyiri] Yes, initially. Subsequently, however, many representatives of the Greek Orthodox churches joined in.

Initially these endeavors to achieve unity were condemned by the Catholic Church hierarchy, including Pope Pius XI. By 1937, however, we find that an outstanding French Dominican Yves Congar had written about the great significance of ecumenicism from the Catholic viewpoint. Following the 1948 meeting in Amsterdam Pope Pius XII sent observers to work alongside the World Council of Churches. But the real breakthrough occurred in the course of the Vatican II Council. This is primarily the merit of Pope John XXIII. He was aware of the fact that a divided Christianity not only removes the credibility of Christianity, but also damages humanity as a whole.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why did the Catholic Church resist so long, in your view?

[Nyiri] The resistance was based on theological considerations. As long as the Catholic Church sought and envisioned in a one-sided manner the cause of schism in the other churches, as long as Catholic theology regarded schism as erroneous and qualified it as a sin, returning the other churches to the Catholic fold appeared to be the only passable way. Much was needed before Catholic theology would change its views, for example, before the Church recognized the significance of dialogue.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Dialogue between believers and nonbelievers?

[Nyiri] At first between believers and believers. In general, between various outlooks on life and between people having various outlooks on life. This was a truly novel approach. It was proclaimed by Pope Paul VI in his Encyclical "Ecclesiam Suam."

[NEPSZABADSAG] This also occurred in the course of Vatican II, but after the death of Pope John XXIII.

[Nyiri] Yes, after 1968. The essence of the initiative by Pope Paul VI was that instead of taking opposite sides and in confrontation one should search for the unifying factors. This represented a change in outlook of tremendous significance. We could say that within the Catholic Church the age of Counter-Reformation came to a conclusion at Vatican II.

[NEPSZABADSAG] This history prompts one to think about a host of current political matters.

[Nyiri] Our present political situation is similar in many respects, or, better said: Results similar to those achieved in the area of ecumenical dialogue would be needed in today's political situation. The essence of dialogue is that I try to understand why another person professes what he does, just why exactly that other person adopted that view, i.e. I want to understand him. I will not argue about the reasons why he is wrong; I am interested in finding out why he believes something the way he does.

True, ecumenicism has an easier job, because we share the Holy Scriptures, our initial councils were common, and the great professions of faith are also common. In other words, among the treasures of Christian idealism

far more things are common than issues which divide us. Unfortunately, we recognized this fact rather late.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Certainly the message borne by this age was needed in order to hold Vatican II, and to accomplish its results.

[Nyiri] I am certain that the political relaxation of those days, and Kennedy and Khrushchev helped in this regard. A recognition of the fact that the representation of Christianity has no credibility if we fight with each other helped. Just as the new phenomenon of the global spread of atheism did. As Catholics we faced this matter only after Vatican II, and in those days we regarded that phenomenon as a much graver challenge than we do today.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, this inclination to cooperate was brought to life by mundane matters indeed.

[Nyiri] Most certainly, just as I am convinced that the schism was also prompted by mundane matters.

[NEPSZABADSAG] At this point, would you please briefly summarize the domestic course followed by ecumenicism. I would think that something could be said about the situation between the two world wars, and about the events after World War II. In this relation permit me to recall a personal experience.

I was raised as a Catholic, thus I studied religion. Moreover, I studied religion not just at any time, but at the time when Rakosi's group was extremely rough with the churches, but in particular with the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, our religion teacher taught us in those days which tested human beings, in a small town in which Catholics were in an absolute majority, that an expression of interest in any other religion constitutes a sin. It was a sin, for example, for me as a little boy to look inside the Reformed Church through its window. This is obviously an extreme example, but this is how we were brought up.

[Nyiri] You? How about us? The churches were very sharply opposed to each other between the two world wars. The regime called itself "Christian national course"; Horthy, as well as Bethlen belonged to the Reformed Church. There were constant skirmishes about the issue of whether a Catholic or a Protestant should be appointed to a given public office. Things were made more complicated by the fact that the state was a kingdom in which the Catholic Church had prerogatives. Finally, in the Catholic-Protestant standoff, Protestantism defined itself primarily in a negative manner. This of course was no Protestant invention. As we can see in the Gospel, when Christianity departed from Judaism it defined itself in the same negative fashion—i.e., in what ways we are different from others—and this outlook maintained itself for a long time and constantly lead to renewed arguments.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Nevertheless, a Catholic hegemony prevailed between the two world wars in Hungary. Here we have, for example, the Virgin Mary's Hungary, the cultivation of Saint Imre, etc.

[Nyiri] Perhaps it is appropriate to use the term "hegemony." On the other hand we must not lose sight of the fact that here we are talking about historical, political symbols of great significance.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are you referring to the cultivation of Our Lady, the Virgin Mary?

[Nyiri] Our Lady, the Virgin Mary, alternatively the Patroness of Hungary, is the symbol of independent Hungarian statehood. After all, King Geza I and King Kalman turned against Popes Gergely VII and Orban II on the basis of this symbol. These popes wanted to extend their feudal domain to include Hungary, and the rejection was based on the idea that such extension of the feudal domain would be impossible because the Virgin Mary is the Queen of Hungary—Saint Stephen offered the country to her. I believe that these political symbols could be accepted without regard to differences between religions.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, this was the situation between the two world wars.

[Nyiri] In the aftermath of World War II, there was rather substantial cooperation between the churches for a while, let's say until 1948. This was more like a political unity, of course. Thereafter, however, no ecumenical work of any kind could be pursued, not officially at least.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Was it opposed from a political standpoint, or was it prohibited?

[Nyiri] Look, we all know how it went: objections, whispered messages, warnings, etc.

[NEPSZABADSAG] I am asking this question because this is a matter people know very little about, the fact that even ecumenicism was objected to during the Rakosi era.

[Nyiri] They objected to it, of course, because they thought that cooperation among the Christian churches would mean cooperation against communism, against the regime.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Were the Hungarian churches prompted to orient themselves in the direction of ecumenicism as a result of the lessons learned in those days? What is your view?

[Nyiri] Only after Vatican II, of course. It took quite some time to analyze and learn the teachings provided by the Council, and this process is still not complete. But then during the sixties and the seventies there were several gatherings in which the ministers and priests of several religions took part, and conversed and lectured about these issues.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, this matter started out at the lower levels.

[Nyiri] Yes, but then development also began at a higher level. Joint ecumenical prayer weeks were organized. Religious leaders jointly prayed in each others' churches. For example, we invited the deans of the Protestant theological academies and they invited us. Nevertheless, in my view this still includes much formality, because we find real ecumenicism at the base. Among youth, in various groupings. There the common, fundamental truths, Jesus and God, are far more important. In those places there is much less talk about what divides Christians. In this regard a certain lack of knowledge serves as a contributing factor, because they do not know what separates them, all they know is what unites them.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You are mentioning the word, the concept of "base." What comes to mind inescapably is another concept we have heard a lot about in recent years: the concept of base communities. And as a result of that yet another issue comes to mind.

Our society is just about to step out from a condition of latent pluralism into conditions of open pluralism. What can be expected as a result in terms of religious life? Viewed from the outside it seems that the very existence of base communities constitutes the embodiment of a trend toward pluralism. I believe that it was no coincidence that there were so many storms in recent years around the person of Gyorgy Bulanyi whom the public regards as the symbol of base communities.

[Nyiri] It is not easy to discuss this matter because not too long ago conditions were different from what they are today. In any event, I always tried to ease the debate surrounding base communities. At the same time I understand to a certain degree why Cardinal Lekai said what he said with regard to this issue.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could it be that he was guided by political considerations?

[Nyiri] In part he was guided by certain political considerations, in part by certain indirect political considerations, nevertheless he spoke as a result of constraint.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could we say in retrospect that he did not speak his conviction, his faith?

[Nyiri] Look, at the beginning he spoke on the basis of his convictions, but then he was teased into this. He was teased into this by some who later received their proper reward.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Like what?

[Nyiri] Perhaps the rank of a bishop.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, in those days you advocated tolerance toward base communities.

[Nyiri] As much as I could. I am convinced that in a modern, industrialized society the old, so-called people's

church structures would not be viable. Society needs small communities so as to enable persons who do not adapt to society well, persons devoid of orientation, to receive their primarily social adaptation skills, and to develop into normal, healthy individuals as a result of a secondary social adaptation process.

Further, the small community existence is interesting because there a community of people takes shape which develops its own system of symbols, their equal values, and through those they generate religion at the same time. The fact that here in Hungary sociological studies demonstrate that during the last decade the number of religious persons has increased by 50 percent is to be credited largely to the small communities.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Let us return to the previous question. What kinds of pluralization phenomena could one expect in the future, beyond the base communities? Is religious life going to become more multifaceted, more varied; will there be greater variety in religious life?

[Nyiri] By all means. True, most certainly this will be accompanied by confusion, but I believe that thereafter a very positive development will follow. Just why do I envision this possibility? I see this in the fact that a continuously increasing number of people become consciously religious on the basis of their convictions. Whether a person is religious and if so what religion a person follows is increasingly becoming a matter of choice and of independent decision. This decision and this choice will in turn contribute to both society and the Church some responsible, adult, mature personalities. It is possible that as compared to the present growth the number of those who regard themselves as religious will decline. Many become disillusioned, because we are unable to answer their questions. Perhaps they may be expecting something we cannot provide from the outset. And as a result of a general liberalization of life, with the general enforcement of human rights, the freedom of conscience will also make its effect strongly felt in the religious area. This is also part of the pluralization process.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In your view—what you can see on the basis of today's situation—could we expect a future growth in the political role of the churches?

[Nyiri] Churches do have a political mission, or as we say in the language of theology: a prophetic mission under all circumstances. In the Old Testament we read that the prophets always criticized the kings, whenever the kings deviated from the proper path, whenever they oppressed the people. Accordingly, the prophets were critical of social injustice. Today it is still the divine mission of the Church to stand up against all kinds of social injustice.

At the same time it is not the Church's nor the clergy's role to become involved in everyday politics, or to become deeply involved in party politics. The clergy must not accept any partisan political function. On the other hand, it is the duty of every Christian to assume responsibility for the well-being of the community, for

the public good. In contrast, it is the task of the clergy, or priests to awaken the Christian faithful to recognize this responsibility.

I was quite stunned when I heard of the idea that the churches need representation too. It is possible that the other churches need representatives, but the Catholic church does not need any. The Catholic Church will be fully satisfied if its dedicated faithful are seated in Parliament.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you think it is conceivable that if a sufficiently large number of Catholic representatives are assembled in Parliament, a Catholic faction may come about? I do not have a party faction in mind.

[Nyiri] I would not find a faction like that to be appropriate. Because I have yet to be told what is specifically Catholic in the framework of political decisions and elections? No specific political decisions or choices may be deduced from the Catholic religion. All of us are aware of the fact that one must produce, that in the course of life many people need some kind of social assistance, and that civil rights and fundamental values must be secured. At best, one finds a difference of opinion as to how best to achieve all of this. And in this regard the Catholic religion or faith does not provide any guidance.

[NEPSZABADSAG] And yet we find, in more than one country, that the Catholic Church is more supportive of Christian democratic parties, than it is of, say, the social democrats.

[Nyiri] You obviously have West Germany or Italy in mind. In my view in those countries this is a consequence of historic development. Following Hitler's system the victorious powers placed their confidence in the churches. Accordingly in these cases the Church acquired some jurisdiction by necessity, so to speak. In Italy the situation was the same after Mussolini. But, for example, in Austria the Church is entirely neutral vis-a-vis the various parties. And this is to the credit of Cardinal Konig.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Could you perceive a similar situation in Hungary? A situation in which the Catholic Church does not support the Christian Democratic Party or the Christian Democratic People's Party?

[Nyiri] I cannot at all perceive a situation in which the Church would support these parties.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Would such support be a mistake in your view?

[Nyiri] Clearly it would be a mistake, because the age of any kind of clericalism is bygone. The Church must represent the interests of society, not those of the Church. We will see just how a given party is capable of realizing and defending the above-mentioned fundamental values, what kinds of conditions there will be for

human dignity and for the freedom of conscience, how the economy will function, and how the weak will be protected.

Here we have, for example, the Christian Democratic Party which includes very decent Christian people who represent the peculiar values of a Christian outlook. But for this reason alone the Church cannot provide any advantages to these people. Most certainly, a Christian Democratic Party will lay great emphasis on the protection of families. But I could imagine that some other party would protect the family in the same way.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In recent times the political changes of our days were accompanied by emotions that are difficult to harness. In your view, as a representative of the Catholic Church, could your church play a role in achieving a possible national reconciliation? And if so, what kind of role and how?

[Nyiri] It must play a role, because if it does not accept this task it would be seriously delinquent. I believe that the Church could help, primarily by casting a more intensive light upon Christian conduct and propagating its characteristics, but mainly by the practical manifestation of Christian conduct. We could achieve particularly good results if the churches could avail themselves to the mass media.

Beyond that, exemplary conduct manifested by sincere, deeply religious Christians who still exist in this country in substantial masses could contribute to reconciliation. The compromise reached among the churches, along with reconciliation, cooperation, and unity, could also serve as examples in the eyes of society. But I prefer to use the term "propitiation," and it is in this sense that I say that I am against holding people accountable for their acts, or even of accounting for their acts.

Accordingly, I would like to stress the fact that loving your enemy is a peculiar message of an ethical character professed by Christians. Loving your enemy in turn means that we turn our enemies into our friends. It is the mission of Christians and of the Catholic Church to win over as friends as many enemies as possible. Based on this, and hoping that the Church is able to perform its mission, I trust that in this country many more people will be friends than enemies.

[NEPSZABADSAG] For myself, and on behalf of the readers of NEPSZABADSAG I wish to thank you for what you have just said. I believe that in these days when all of us are filled with concerns and worries about the future, your confident and encouraging words will be well received, particularly around Christmas time and at the beginning of a new year.

Jewish View

25000581 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
23 Dec 89 p 19

[Interview with Alfred Schoner, Budapest chief rabbi and National Assembly representative, by Gabor Fodor: "How Does It Feel To Be Chief Rabbi?"; date and place not given]

[Text] He is 41 years old. He received his first diploma at the National Rabbinical Institute. Thereafter he completed his studies in library sciences and art history at the Lorand Eotvos University of Sciences. He holds a doctoral degree in art history. He has served as a rabbi in Szeged and in Buda. Since 1985 he has been heading the synagogue on Dohany Street. For the past three years he has served in the capacity of chief rabbi as chairman of the National Rabbinical Council. He is a member of the American body of conservative rabbis. His name appears on almost 200 publications. As a highly visible personality in public life he serves as an elected representative in the National Assembly. The fact that this year Hanukkah, one of the most beautiful Jewish holidays, coincides with Christmas provided a good opportunity for this conversation.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How does it feel to be chief rabbi in Hungary?

[Schoner] It's very complex. A shortage economy of principles escalates the existential insecurity sensed by everyone. At the same time the image of a pluralistic society is taking shape, in which the spiritual sphere of movement is larger, the taboos disappear, and one can discuss matters he could not discuss before. As if the average person would be wearing the title of one of Stefan Zweig's most famous novels! There is no doubt that insofar as the majority is concerned this is the period of "Confused Emotions." Those who have firm and, let me add, useful principles find themselves in an easier situation. These people will not despair in darkness, and they will not be dazzled once they reach the sunshine. Religious people are of this kind. Accordingly, I consider myself one of these.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you think it is conceivable that a Christian regime would follow the communist regime, and if so, how would that affect you personally?

[Schoner] As a man raised on the Bible, let me respond with Amos' words: "I am neither a prophet, nor am I the son of a prophet." I cannot foresee the future. Moreover, I am unable to see many things in the past. On the other hand, I believe that I know that one must distinguish between Christianity in the classic sense of that term, and regimes based on principles of faith which have been established. When the two meet something novel may come about. If they do not meet, people must be confronting a series of serious conflicts. I was also touched by your question. Some sentiments, some thoughts, some fears arose in me. I also read some statements written by theologians, which delimit themselves from a

Christian course, but to an even lesser extent do they delimit themselves from Christian ideology. I very much hope that there will be no Christian regime in Hungary, in the pejorative sense of that term. And this hope of mine is not reduced, on the contrary, it will be reinforced if every progressive ideology, including Christian ideology, is able to freely exert its beneficial activity.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You did not respond to the question of whether you would prefer a system based on communist ideology, or on a Christian ideology....

[Schoner] I do not know what a well functioning communist system is. This kind of thing existed only in the world of dreams, at best. And since I was born after World War II, I do not have any direct experience with regard to what took place before World War II. Perhaps this question should be asked from a Jew who witnessed the hell of Auschwitz, then returned to Hungary with a wounded heart and soul because he was confident that he would see the start of something new. Soon thereafter he was vilified once again. A man like this could perhaps respond to the question of which pain was greater. As far as I am concerned, I would prefer to live in a society that is not labeled with any adjectives, where there is true equality; where being different does not mean a second class status; where everyone can live peacefully, without fear and humiliation.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are you a left-wing person?

[Schoner] I do not like that adjective, either. I espouse an endeavor to achieve social justice as my philosophy, the one the prophets have expressed so many times.

[NEPSZABADSAG] As a believer, do you reject the idea that a man can be the enemy of man?

[Schoner] I do not reject that. But I profess with the Holy Scriptures: "If your enemy is hungry, feed him, if he is thirsty give him water."

[NEPSZABADSAG] What do you regard as the most significant condition for social peace?

[Schoner] In one of my sermons during the great holidays I addressed the issue of how that fantastic monstrosity, the bridge over the Bosphorus, was built. That bridge links two continents. It links Asia and Europe. In my view the association is not at all forced: When will people be able to build bridges between one another, people who are separated from each other by only 50 centimeters?

[NEPSZABADSAG] Enemies who are physically close to each other?

[Schoner] No! The friends first. I am convinced that the first ones to reach an agreement should be those motivated by identical interests, beliefs, and convictions. Take a look at history, or even at the present everyday situation! How many streams of thoughts, factions, and fights between brothers we find in the parties! How could opposing parties understand each other better if not even

those who want to form alliances for the achievement of a common cause are able to reach agreements?!

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you regard anti-Semites as your enemies?

[Schoner] That could not be otherwise. But I regard them as my enemies only in their faculty of being anti-Semites, and not as people.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Don't you think that these days one should initiate cooperation among people of different faiths and different convictions against any and all racism?

[Schoner] It is possible, but I believe that there such cooperation exists, except that in and of itself that cooperation does not resolve the issue. Anti-Semitism is extremely deep-rooted, and only developed democracies are capable of manifesting appropriate resistance to it. One reads in the Book of Esther that Haman, the prime minister, accused the Jews before the king: "There is a people dispersed throughout the world, whose laws are different from those of any other people." There are Jewish, Gypsy, Armenian, Hungarian distinctive features. And if trouble occurs somewhere, there always will be some who would like to sacrifice those people as scapegoats who in some respect differ from the rest. This is a familiar solution by which emotions that rose for entirely different reasons are momentarily calmed down. And since at this time there is trouble in Hungary, they have begun looking for a scapegoat.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you have personal experiences to this effect?

[Schoner] I did not make any preparations for your questions, but by coincidence I have here on my table a signed letter complete with an address. The letter states that we Jews should not feed the fire, that we should not bring upon ourselves the ire of the people, and that we should recognize at last that the war did not affect us more severely than other people! All I want to add to this is that among the 600,000 Jews they dragged away, and who died in a manner not befitting human beings, I had four half brothers and sisters (the oldest one was 14 years old), and 39 members of my family. Those, who in those days risked their lives and concealed Jews have all my respect, but the fact is that the state did not protect its Jewish citizens, and there were only a few places like that in Europe.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is it conceivable that a certain state anti-Semitism would appear in Hungary?

[Schoner] That is hardly conceivable. But if it does, it will not be able to function. Even the anti-Judaist and anti-Zionist statements evoke extremely unfavorable reactions from the outside, and this cannot be simply ignored in the course of making calculations. Both national and Jewish interests contradict this possibility. Accordingly, so that such a thing cannot happen even by

coincidence, the need calls for the strengthening of both the national and the Jewish consciousness.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Jewish consciousness?

[Schoner] Yes. Integration, not assimilation is called for.

[NEPSZABADSAG] With rights to state representation?

[Schoner] Also those. It would be impossible, for example, to reach a decision concerning an issue like birth control without knowing the views of the 7 million member Catholic Church. At the same time, in a democratic country one cannot dispute the right of religious minorities to enforce their interests.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Accordingly, in a certain sense you recognize the political role of churches.

[Schoner] No, I would not call this political involvement. The churches do not want to take part in partisan political struggles, and in my view they are acting properly if they stay away from that. This is not their mission.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Political involvement is conceivable through avenues other than political parties. Ultimately politics amount to a process of integrating interests, in which interest groups not having the character of political parties may also acquire an important role to play.

[Schoner] That is true, but then let us talk about the broader public life which has an effect on the molding of the political will and decisions. I personally participate in that.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Hanukkah is the holiday of lights. It reminds Jews of the victory over those who desecrated the Jewish synagogue of Jerusalem 2,000 years ago. Is it possible to celebrate light amid so many kinds of crises as everyone is struck by in this country—Jews and non-Jews alike?

[Schoner] My response to this is that one not only can, but must celebrate. One of the great philosophers of ancient times discussed the matter of how one should light the candles on this holiday lasting eight days. This was his suggestion: At first all eight candles should be lit, and then, as the holiday shortens always light one fewer candle than the day before. But we also had another great thinker who felt that the opposite sequence would be appropriate, because, as he said, "one must always increase in regard to matters sacred," rather than following a decreasing trend. In today's language the latter means that one must always increase in terms of morality. And I feel that this is the truth, it should be taken to heart particularly in these days. The moral crisis is the most burdensome and most difficult to bear among the many kinds of crises that strike us today. If the churches could assist with anything, it would be primarily in the area of defeating the moral crisis. There is no well functioning economy without morality, and there are no well functioning human relations. Without morals

there is no life meet for human beings. This is what the candles on Christmas trees and in Jewish candle holders should shed light on.

POLAND

Societal Difficulties in Adjusting to Democracy, Free Market Noted

90EP0212A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
4-5 Nov 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by Krystyna Lubelska: "Clouded Mind"]

[Text] Jan Jozef Szczepanski once wrote: "I had the good fortune to have been born in a country with a moderate climate, where there are no earthquakes or devastating hurricanes."

I had the misfortune to have been born in a country with a political temperature that is often nearly tropical, where the winds of history disturb the lives of its citizens. Looking at the map of today's political climate, some people see an extended storm, others impending clearing, but regardless of whether the forecasts are optimistic or pessimistic, even dismal, today's social mood is fluctuating in "the lower realms of high feelings," so there is no sense of national disaster or hint of tragedy. There is dissatisfaction and disagreement over the economic situation, sometimes expressed loudly, but without specific consequences in the form of strikes or mass street demonstrations. I do not imagine that over the next 6 months the society is going to accept the current price of bread and butter without some active dissension. Today, although people complain, they are paying the price for the crisis and economic waste. Why pay? Why are people willing to pay at all?

Some say that there is no way out, that this is the last chance, but in response to such a complicated question this answer is too facile. So where should we look for the roots of national awareness? In socialist formation? In patriotism? In the ideology of "Solidarity"? All three of these factors and a few more overlap. The new social attitudes presently being projected do not immediately obliterate the spirit of socialist education in which we have been insistently reared for several decades. During this time people learned perfectly well that in exchange for certain limitations on their freedoms and restrictions on their liberty of thought, the state did relieve them of some responsibility for their own life. The state is therefore not only a distributor of material goods but also a great organizer putting social structures in order. This also means even the smallest cell, which in the terminology of the time was the phrase used to designate the family. In this way we achieved the effect of a double spiral. Just as the various links in the nucleotide chain are connected to one another, so in the genetic code of our social life, there was a mutual bond in keeping with

the authority-citizen, citizen-authority principle. Independent genes rarely occurred, and when they did, they were viewed as undesirable mutations which threatened the health of the nation.

Today, on the other hand, the citizen is expected to be independent, clever, and self-sufficient. Today it is not enough for him to stand in line for housing, a car, or washing machine and just wait. Today the government wants the citizen to share in the decisionmaking, and Minister [of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs] Kuron asks him his opinion on tax matters. Today the citizen is asked to set up an employees' self-management group and a regional self-government. In a word, part of the responsibility for the success or failure of the reforms is being thrust upon the citizen. It is not therefore surprising that he feels somewhat distressed.

The situation used to be simpler. They were "them," and we were "us." Anyone going into politics crossed over to the other side of the barricade. He became somebody prominent. Although the public did not wish him particularly well, the way to riches and access to scarce goods opened before him. The rules of play, which have now blurred, were uncomplicated. The average Pole is no "homo politicus" and was not educated to be. According to sociologist Docent Mirosława Marody, the sphere of political activity in Poland is like a strange appendage and is not eagerly accepted. For many people, today's changes consist mainly in replacing some people in the power elite with others. They say that now even Kuron has become one of that gang. He wound up on their side, not ours.

The many years of separation—even a gulf—between the authorities and the society is now making a real imprint on the consciousness of Poles. Professors Henryk Banaszk and Leszek Rowicki, of the University of Warsaw, asked Warsaw residents and college students at an interval of 10 years about the features characteristic of an ideal society. During this decade the frequency with which respondents chose the requirement concerning citizen impact on the running of the government dropped 17 percent. Only 4 percent of those questioned would recommend that their own child choose a career in politics. As many as 80 percent rejected such a life path for their offspring. This is obvious proof of the extent to which people are removed from and reject politics, and of how they hold politics in low esteem and even ignore it. According to recent research by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), Poles' activity does not extend beyond the area of home and work. Making money is the key motivation for their activity and endeavors (72 percent).

On the basis of these data we might suppose that Poles hold within them a longing for a dictator who, as dictators are wont to do, will ask them no questions about how they feel about anything but will finally fill up the store shelves, especially since material needs, such as color television sets, video recorders, automatic washing machines, and so on, are mentioned extremely strongly

by the society. Eighty percent of Poles consider economic effectiveness to be the most important feature of a good political system. Ten years ago, three-quarters of those asked considered equal opportunity regardless of social background to be the most important. Thus, egalitarianism, which many people now support, has lost out to aspirations for a well functioning economy. Docent Marody once said that the dispute over the question of "have or be" is a typical one and can be important in wealthy societies. Hallowed words. A crisis causes degradation. During a crisis few people reflect on the functions of democracy, culture, and art. Instead all physical and mental efforts focus on acquiring things.

A feature which is typical of the Polish crisis is the fact that even people with a standard of living sufficient to provide food and clothing feel that the general national poverty touches them, because these things can be taken away from them in various areas. For some people, being poor means not having money to buy breakfast cheese. For others it means no opportunity to buy shoes imported from the West, and for still others, no possibility of buying a washing machine or television set. Although their living conditions are quite different, then, all people consider it essential to struggle through the crisis. This includes the group of people taking advantage of the present softness in the economy and simply making money off the present situation. Even they feel poor and degraded, and they express this fact loudly, sometimes perhaps even more frequently than the others.

So then are things really so bad for us that we reject all aspirations for democracy and dream of a dictatorship with a full purse? The sociologists assess the state of today's social consciousness as "confused" and "disturbed." The traditional ways of running things have been compromised. The government is no longer the focus of complaints. Nonetheless, 80 percent of those asked (Banaszak, Rowicki) consider it the government's duty to see that every family has a place to live, 70 percent think that schools should be free, 60 percent think health care should be free, and nearly half think that it is the government's duty to see that the citizen has a job that fits his qualifications. These are the demands being made on a government which has absolutely no intention of fulfilling them, first because it is bankrupt, and second because the system and methods of meeting the needs of the citizenry are being changed. Instead of assuming the duty of comprehensive care of everyone, the state is only looking after the poorest and the weakest. The rest have to get along as best they can. For a citizen of People's Poland, this situation is so new that it is not surprising that he feels lost in it.

For many years there was the conviction in Poland, one which was effectively supported by the mass media, that the system was good, only the people were imperfect. They had not grown up. Laziness, sloppy work, cliques, favoritism, and drunkenness were frequently listed as the reasons why socialism had not flourished sooner. In

1978 they were given as the major causes of the economic difficulties (the word "crisis" did not exist then) we were living through. In 1988, 92 percent of the people considered a defective economic system (Banaszak, Rowicki) to be the major cause of the crisis. The respondents also mentioned these other important causes most frequently: erroneous decisions made by people in high places, abuse of power, and incompetent people in leadership positions. Lack of respect for public property was most frequently listed as a shortcoming of citizens. Other national defects seemed less important, but those questioned judged citizen passivity and indifference demonstrated by citizens to be bad.

The most important question now, then, is whether Poles will remain passive, whether they will continue to regard it dishonorable to take part in government. One must surely probe the national consciousness deeply and thoroughly to answer this question. One thing is certain: any sort of energetic action will come out of hope, not despair. We are just setting out on the road. New forms of citizen action are just being created. As always in Poland, they are initially being taken with skepticism, to be accepted only later. This caution is justified. It is a reflex of social self-defense, because we have lived through calamity and disappointment.

I was lucky, however, to have been born in a country which after all never gives up.

YUGOSLAVIA

Zagreb Mayor Discusses City's Problems

90EB0150A Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian
7 Nov 89 pp 64-66

[Interview with Dr. Mato Mikic, mayor of Zagreb and professor at the School of Economics of Zagreb University, by Mila Stula: "Fond Wishes, Hard Reality"; date and place not given]

[Text] Speaking about his city, Dr. Mato Mikic, mayor of Zagreb and professor at the School of Economics of Zagreb University, quoted a sentence from the Declaration of the First World Conference of Historic Cities, held in Kyoto, which states that "the city is a magnificent achievement of human intelligence and creativity, which is why living in the city is an advantage, a pleasure, a form of wealth and satisfaction, but also an obligation and a responsibility." We spoke with the mayor about what it is like living in Zagreb.

[Mikic] I am not the mayor, but president of the Zagreb City Assembly. There is a great difference between these two terms. After all, the president of the city assembly is above all the president of the supreme body of government and self-management in the city. It is up to him to convene meetings, he is, then, a delegate in the assembly, he is supposed to coordinate the efforts of all bodies and institutions, and he is supposed to represent the city.

[DANAS] A position, then, consisting more of work and ceremony than of the exercise of authority?

[Mikic] It is unfortunately true that the way this position is defined in our legislation, that is exactly what it involves. The president of the city assembly cannot issue any sort of edicts, decisions, or orders which are enforceable and mandatory. I would say that that is the real reason why no responsibility has been precisely established either for the performance of this function or for the situation in the city. The new charter of the City of Zagreb must deal systematically with this issue and establish far greater powers for the president of the Zagreb City Assembly. This is, after all, a big job, one requiring good familiarity with the city, the structure of power and self-management, as well as the functions of the personnel doing these jobs.

[DANAS] Every city stands on a particular site and has precisely established ownership. What is the case with Zagreb?

[Mikic] The territory of Zagreb encompasses 1,709 km². That is the area to which our powers extend. The property of Zagreb includes the buildings, some of the land, some of the equipment, institutions of particular public interest, and so on. So, on the basis of ownership we do have a certain right concerning all that.

[DANAS] Can one also speak about the value of that property?

[Mikic] That would be very difficult. All property has had to be constantly revalued. It is easier to express all that in physical quantities than in value terms. How is one to calculate, for instance, the value of the Mimara Museum, which is the property of Zagreb?! However, it is a fact that the land records on all the wealth in the city have not been kept properly and up-to-date. Because of various institutional and organizational changes both in Zagreb and in its opstinas, and also in the republic, the question of who owns what still has not been altogether cleared up. However, even the state is still not aware of all that it owns. We face the task of ascertaining that in a systematic way.

[DANAS] It obviously is not easy to resolve relations even with our own republic, much less with others. However, it is interesting that between Yugoslav cities there has never been the kind of disagreement that there has been at the level of the republics and provinces.

[Mikic] That is true. Neither Zagreb nor other cities have ever been involved in the kind of confrontations and differences in action and attitudes as has been the case at the level of the state, and when I say the state, I am thinking specifically of relations among the republics. For instance, during the recent flood and assault of subsurface water in Zagreb, Belgrade was one of the first cities which sent to us expressions of sympathy and expressed a readiness to help. Many others also came forward. Incidentally, friendship caravans set out regularly from Zagreb and Belgrade, and we communicate

every week on the problems we face in this job. What is more, cooperation through the Permanent Conference of Yugoslav Cities and the Alliance of Croatian Cities and direct cooperation among the capitals of the republics and provinces are also very important to us.

[DANAS] For a long time it was said of Zagreb that it regularly got mayors who actually did not like Zagreb. It seems that you and Zagreb display your love publicly. However, the people of Zagreb are as dissatisfied with the city as they are satisfied with their mayor. How do you interpret that?

[Mikic] It is difficult for me to comment on that. It is true that I love Zagreb, and I have identified myself with it. However, the people of Zagreb love their city, and it is understandable that they should be so critical. However, there has also been exaggeration in this respect. Even in praise, but more frequently in criticism. After all, our wishes are far greater than our capabilities.

[DANAS] We might also put it this way: on the one hand, we have the Mimara Museum, while on the other, 100,000 citizens do not have drinking water!

[Mikic] That is the reality of the city and of its rapid urban development. One thing is certain, it will be a long time yet before all citizens of Zagreb have equally satisfactory living conditions.

[DANAS] It is a fact, however, that life in Zagreb is becoming poorer and poorer and the quality of life is declining.

[Mikic] It depends on where you look. We might also speak about the progress that has been achieved, but the crisis is taking its toll—some citizens with the lowest income are having a very hard time getting along. I would say that the crisis is hitting the cities worse than for the country as a whole on average, since the urban population as a rule depends upon its wages and salaries. And it is clear to us all what is happening with wages and salaries. In Zagreb, this September the average personal income was 7.8 million dinars. When you compare that with last year, the drop is evident, although certain figures indicate a rise in real personal income. As far as I am concerned, I am very cautious in using that kind of statistical data, since at a monthly inflation rate of 50 percent wages and salaries paid on the 1st of the month mean something quite different from those paid at the end of the same month.

[DANAS] We will repeat our question: That means that the poor are more and more numerous?

[Mikic] The concept of wealth and poverty is pretty relative. It is a fact that most of the population is having a hard time getting along. However, there are also those who are augmenting their wealth, but they represent a far smaller number. The Zagreb trade unions still do not have proper records on how many households (and this applies only to people who are employed) should be receiving welfare. The social welfare being offered by the

Centers for Social Work does not cover even minimal living conditions of the citizens. In Zagreb, there are more than 500,000 employed persons, and I would not dare to put a number on the percentage of those below the poverty level. However, the very fact that we have approximately 30,000 more households in the city than we have housing units already says a lot. We have had rapid housing construction over a relatively lengthy period of time, but we have always had a shortage of about 20,000 units. For example, in 1983, 11,500 units were completed, and last year 3,500. If we bear in mind that our city's population is growing by 7,000-8,000 a year, that means that we ought to be building between 2,500 and 3,000 units a year just for the quantitative growth of the population. Without, of course, solving the problems that we have had up to now.

[DANAS] In other words, some fellow citizens are doomed to being without an apartment....

[Mikic] Unfortunately, yes, and those problems are particularly pronounced in certain organizations and institutions rendering public and social services—judicial bodies, internal affairs, and municipal services. There is no visible prospect for solving this problem under present conditions. In my opinion, this is one of the most difficult problems weighing on Zagreb, one whose postponement can no longer be tolerated, but unfortunately no solution is in the offing.

[DANAS] It is a fact that the issue of the housing reform is urgent. However, housing policy under socialism is a story in itself....

[Mikic] True, but it must not be forgotten that it is expressed in a particular way in socialism because of the constant process of urbanization. We in the republic, for example, have a higher number of housing units than households, but that datum cannot help us to arrive at a correct assessment. Some of the so-called housing units are altogether unusable, they are located in certain abandoned rural settlements, some have been demolished, but they are still kept in the records as housing units. Incidentally, all of that is the consequence of the powerful socioeconomic transformation of the population. It took France 70 years to reduce the number of farmers by 30 percentage points, while in 1945 we had 75 percent, and today we have reduced that population to less than 20 percent.

[DANAS] When the migrants come to the city, they bring their habits with them. Many are inclined to say that Zagreb has not been successful in imposing its way of life on them, but on the contrary, the newcomers have imposed their value system on Zagreb. Is that true?

[Mikic] I would categorically say that the process of urbanization should be given a favorable assessment by definition. It is an expression and an indicator of progress, since the migrants are ordinarily young people who are augmenting the able-bodied group and work potential of the population, and they also mean the new richness which every individual brings with him. The

way they are treated by the city is another question. It is true that Zagreb has lost some of its characteristics which it had before World Wars I and II, but what it has gained in another sense, in development, is also the truth. Incidentally, had Zagreb remained in its development solely at the level of natural population growth, which in 1988 was 1,852 inhabitants, it would not have a population of 940,000 today, nor would it have achieved this kind of development. There is an interesting indicator in the 1981 Population Census. At that time, Zagreb had a population of 856,000, 401,000 of whom were born in Zagreb. The demographers expect that the number of those born in Zagreb and those who have come from elsewhere will be equal somewhere near the end of the century.

[DANAS] Can you tell us something about the ethnic composition of the city?

[Mikic] According to the last population census, the city consists 70 percent of Croats, 11 percent of Serbs, and 1 percent of Slovenes.

[DANAS] And Albanians?

[Mikic] According to the census, relatively few—only about 1,500, but we know that they are much more numerous. However, this refers only to those who are registered—the number of temporary residents is somewhat higher, and the number of those not registered at all is the highest. Unfortunately, I must say that we have not had satisfactory performance from the agencies that deal with this question.

[DANAS] Some of those who are not registered, incidentally, are supplying the Zagreb markets, isn't that so?

[Mikic] A large proportion of those supplying food and farm products in Zagreb come from Macedonia, southern Serbia, and Kosovo. It is a fact that supplying cities is not a simple matter at all, large cities especially. Zagreb will never be able to work out its own supply on its own, but it could improve it considerably. That is why we need further development of Crnac and Lonjsko Polje, as well as proper utilization of the farmland in the vicinity of Zapresici and Samobor. However, cooperation with other regions will always be very necessary.

[DANAS] Everyone is talking about the cooperation you have referred to, but everyone is also complaining that the Yugoslav market is compartmentalized!

[Mikic] I would say that Zagreb is one of the most open cities in Yugoslavia for marketing goods and produce....

[DANAS] But they say that in all cities!

[Mikic] Fortunately for Zagreb, this is demonstrated by our trade sectors. It is a disaster for any city to give preference to its own products or the products of its immediate vicinity. Only openness and competition guarantee quality, sufficient supply, and the possibility

of choice, and under certain other normal conditions, without our inflation, they also have an effect on the prices of products.

[DANAS] Municipal public transportation is an inevitable topic of all conversations in Zagreb. How is that Gordian knot of the monopolist to be untied, without a streetcar ticket, for example, costing more than a newspaper?

[Mikic] That is such a multilayered problem, determined by various conditions—by the city's size, by the land-use plan and urban plan, by various historical nuclei and the chronic shortage of money, by poor organization, and by many other things, that it is very difficult to solve. The question is how to reconcile efficiency, rate of income and development, and at the same time maintain those routes which mean a net loss. We are aware of the fact that good organization of municipal public transportation is a part of overall productivity in a city, and we have also striven for Zagreb to use every transportation capability from private transportation to the railroads, along with streetcars and buses. Many have come to us and offered to organize public transportation, but they have all shown an interest only in those routes which are operating at a profit, but people also live in those sections of the city where the transportation lines lose money. There have also been proposals for doing away with those routes, but the question is what the citizens would say about that.

[DANAS] But it is a fact that this problem cannot be solved just by raising the price of a ticket!

[Mikic] No society has operated that way, so we must not do it either. Everywhere they use subsidies. However, in one period we wanted to throw everything out of the budget, out of the funds, and we put everything in the pure economic conditions of the market. It is also possible that as the standard of living rises these costs become more tolerable than under the conditions of poverty. To be specific, the ZET [Zagreb Electric Tranway] covers simple reproduction out of the price of its services, and expanded reproduction through capital formation and the pooling of capital. When the ZET is transformed in accordance with the Law on Enterprises, whereby the ZET becomes a public enterprise, the city will acquire special powers over it, and I believe that this problem will also be easier to solve.

[DANAS] And the decision on the free formation of the prices of other municipal services in the city?

[Mikic] Allow me to say that this is unfortunately a misunderstanding. The executive council of the city's assembly did formally adopt such a decision so that it would not have to constantly concern itself with the question of unceasing revaluation of prices. Because of public reaction social price controls have been reintroduced, but that will not solve anything. The main thing is to change relations in the business operation of work organizations rendering municipal services.

[DANAS] Money is obviously the measure of all things, especially of development. What about the economy of Zagreb in that context?

[Mikic] Stagnation has been observed for several years now. There is no growth of production and income, and in distribution an ever smaller share is left to the disposition of the economy. The most pronounced problems are in the branches with a low rate of capital formation, such as the textile industry, the construction industry, and the leather and footwear industry. However, there are also those who have good earnings: for example, most of the chemical industry, machinebuilding, the electrical products industry, and telecommunications. The spread in personal incomes between the branches that are not well off and those that are goes even as high as 1:10. Although Zagreb's exports are smaller than its share in Croatia's social product (30 percent) and the social product of Yugoslavia (7 percent), the pattern of exports is extremely favorable. Products in a high phase of manufacturing—predominantly equipment—are being exported and represent 28 percent of Zagreb's entire industry. We are referring to Prvomajska, Tesla, Jedinstvo, TPK, Koncar, and certain others. Pliva, for example, will have exports amounting to \$120 million this year, \$100 million of which are going to the convertible area. Without that, Pliva would not be able to survive on the Yugoslav market even though its output amounts to more than one-third of the entire Yugoslav pharmaceutical industry....

[DANAS] And even though hospitals in Zagreb do not have penicillin!

[Mikic] Yes, in spite of that! However, when it comes to enterprises which have been losing money (the economy of Zagreb has a share of 17 percent in republic losses), I have a somewhat different attitude. The solution is not to liquidate the enterprises which are losing, but to change their production program. What has been done with Agrokomerc, for example, is a disaster, a social crime, and pure maliciousness.

[DANAS] In the long run, was it not also harmful to break up the Associated Bank of Croatia?

[Mikic] I do not know, but the existence of such a large number of banks in Zagreb and Croatia signifies in my opinion only a further deterioration of the economy's position. After all, our banking has not been serving the cause of economic development, but almost represents a drag. Pliva, for example, is unable at the moment to find an appropriate banking partner for its vitamin C program, yet that program is exceedingly interesting to the outside world.

[DANAS] Pliva, however, would also have to find a partner that would help it with money in order to move as quickly as possible from the center of the city, so that Zagreb does not become another Bhopal....

[Mikic] That is true, protection of the environment is a big task for us. We have done a number of things, from gasification to the installation of scrubbers, the construction of sewer mains to protect the groundwater, but it still is not enough. A portion of industry has been moved, a portion of Pliva is moving to Savski Marof, but there still remains the unresolved question of Chromos, Janko Gredelj, and certain others.

[DANAS] The Krsko Nuclear Power Plant is an issue all of itself. Zagreb is one of the rare cities in the world which might find itself in a nuclear sandwich.

[Mikic] That is not really the case. The nuclear power plant is a hazard, but why do we not ask ourselves how the French have literally filled their country with nuclear power plants—75 percent of their power comes from nuclear plants, and yet they do not consider this a threat to life. The same is the case with Belgium, and as far as we are concerned, we will not for the moment add to the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant. The assessment still has to be made whether it is in proper condition or not, but if we are going to talk about the hazard, for us it will be just as great if the Hungarians continue to build the nuclear power plant on the Danube. But it is a fact that we do not have enough electric power.

[DANAS] Not only is there not enough, but in Zagreb it is more and more expensive as well.

[Mikic] That is true, but it is expensive because of the additional load of 5 percent which is set aside to build the distribution network. Over three-fourths of the transformer substations, about 1,400 of them, are in need of very necessary reconstruction; otherwise Zagreb will be left a city in darkness. It is true that we have illuminated Republic Square, but look at our situation on Ilica, Jurisiceva, Tkalciceva, Gajeva, Prosinackih zrtava, and

many other streets. Unless we provide adequate resources, we will have the kind of collapse that we suffered in 1973.

[DANAS] If you were to recapitulate what you have been happy about in your work as mayor so far, and what you have been unhappy with, what would you say?

[Mikic] I might say a great many things, but I will use telegraphese. In spite of the crisis, we are still building the Zagreb University Hospital, we have built the NSB [not further expanded] and the School of Electrical Engineering, the School of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, two secondary school centers and several elementary schools are being built, additions are being made at the Zagreb Airport, we will get our first public garage, and we now have the Mimara Museum; the University Games were held, and there are new environmental programs. It is a lot or a little, depending on how you look at it. I personally am afraid of a collapse which the city might suffer because of something that we are unable to influence at all—because of a shutdown of municipal public transportation, the lack of electric power, or disruption of the operation of the banks. All of this could complicate life in the city.

[DANAS] Following the Pink Floyd Concert in Venice, a pile of trash remained on the streets, and the entire city administration resigned. Have there been times when you considered doing the same thing?

[Mikic] When you hold public office, that kind of dilemma must always be there. For example, the day before the second referendum on the hospital I said that I would resign if the referendum did not pass. After all, that would have meant that the citizens do not believe in the program I advocate. Under that kind of burden, I would not take any pleasure in holding this office.

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